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The Perspective of U.S. Securities Disclosure and the
Process of Globalization
Irina Shirinyan*
I. INTRODUCTION
It is difficult to imagine any country or society that has not been
impacted to some degree by the trend toward globalization. Commu-
nication and technology development, as well as increased trans-
border commercial and financial flows are simultaneously, in part,
both the causes and consequences of globalization. The Internet and
other increased communication abilities have made it easier for com-
panies to raise funds by utilizing the capital market instead of the
traditional commercial bank. As a result, securities markets have in-
creased their international scope. The number of companies listing
their stock on the foreign financial markets has increased greatly. A
good example of the increasing international transactions across dif-
ferent borders is the growth volume of corporate equities transactions.
During 2001, the volume of foreign share transactions on the New
York Stock Exchange increased by fifteen percent. When compared
with 1997, this amounts to an increase in volume by 2.5 times.1
Internationalization of finance has occurred for several reasons.
Among them are the growing demands for capital by corporations, the
liberalization of capital markets, the decreasing role of banks as the
primary corporate financial source, the abatement of trade barriers,
and the interrelation between financial markets.2 Because of global
trading and financial flows, legislation has to respond to the new de-
* Ph.D. (Law), LL.M. I would like to thank Dean Joel Seligman of Washington University
School of Law for his valuable and insightful comments on earlier drafts. I also wish to thank my
friend, Susan Roberto, for her support and encouragement.
1. The volume of trading in non-U.S. stocks averaged 117.2 million shares a day in 2001, a
16.6% increase over last year's 100.6 million. Total non-U.S. volume was 29.1 billion shares in
2001, compared with 25.3 billion in 2000. At year-end, total worldwide market capitalization of
NYSE's non-U.S. companies was $4.9 trillion. It represented 53 countries. Available at http://
www.nyse.com/about/factbook00.html (last visited Oct.15, 2002).
2. See Richard M. Kosnik, Reconciliation of Differing Disclosure Standards: Formal and Ap-
proaches by Regulators and Market Participants, 1306 PLI/Corp 157, 161 (2002) (examining sev-
eral approaches to eliminate or reduce regulatory conflict); Jeffrey E. Garten, Self-Regulation in
the Global Context, 2000 CLMBR 23 (2000) (discussing an issue of changing regulative
demands).
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mands of the global economy.3 Consequently, a discussion regarding
the standard of mandatory disclosure requirements applies not only to
companies entering the foreign capital market, but to domestic com-
panies as well. Should these companies be required to reconcile their
financial statements to the standards of an exchange where their se-
curities are listed or should they be allowed to prepare their financial
statements according to the state or nation of the issuer's domicile, or
another regulatory body, such as the International Accounting Stan-
dards Committee?
While securities laws are territorial and differ from country to coun-
try, they tend to be universal in their goals. They seek to protect the
market as a "social institution ' 4 and increase investor confidence in
the securities markets by reducing the risk of fraud or unfairness in
securities transactions.5 Mandatory disclosure requirements have been
the instrument of choice in realizing these dual goals of securities mar-
ket regulation.6 While the goals are similar, the development of regu-
latory regimes can vary from nation to nation dramatically.
Differences in economic development, culture, legal and social envi-
ronments, and the fact that different legal markets and their corre-
3. IOSCO Responds to Enron-Related Issues, at http://www.iosco.org/iosco.htmI.
4. See Edmund W. Kitch, Proposals for Reform of Securities Regulation: An Overview, 41 VA.
J. Ir'L L. 629, 642 (2001) (responding to a question why after many years of a consensus in
support of U.S. securities regulation commentators believed that change would be beneficial).
Kitch found that "five interrelated developments in recent years have undermined the assump-
tions that supported the consensus. Id. They are: (1) the movement towards freer international
trade and financial flows; (2) changes in communications and transportation technologies; (3)
changes in the regulation itself; (4) the failure of the regulation to achieve its objectives; and (5)
the collapse of a shared faith in the relevance of the helpless-investor model on which the regula-
tion is based." Id. Indisputably, all of these five factors occur. Id. At the same time, all of them
are a derived result of the changes in technologies and communications that are a part of such a
profound process as globalization. Id. The finance of transnational transactions, in its turn, plays
one of the leading roles in these global aggregate economic activities. Id.
4 Joel P. Trachtman, Regulatory Competition and Regulatory Jurisdiction in International Securi-
ties Regulation, (Dec., 1999) available at http://papers2.ssrn.com/paper.taf (last visited Sept. 25,
2002) (arguing for the proposal that securities law is different from corporate law, and the inter-
national setting is different from the U.S. federal setting because the international system has
less institutional capacity to enforce a stable equilibrium). Also, Trachtman concludes that the
problem of regulatory competition requires a political choice between these preference revela-
tion devices. Id. The political choice should be informed by the likely outcomes, in terms of local
societal preferences of the alternatives. Id. While criticizing Professor Romano's approach,
Trachtman points out that Romano does not focus on the problem of externalities in her propos-
als for greater inter-jurisdictional competition. Id. In her proposal for regulatory competition in
the securities field, Romano only considers externalities that arise from competitors' use of dis-
closure. See Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regula-
tion, 107 YALE L. J. 2359 (1998).
5. Joel Seligman, The Historical Need for a Mandatory Corporate Disclosure System, 9 J.
CORP. L. 1, 57 (1983).
6. Id.
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sponding regimes develop at different rates of speed and over
different periods of time have impeded the development of a more
universal approach to disclosure rules and requirements. 7 National
differences explain the existence of different levels of "regulatory hi-
erarchy"'8 in the international securities market. They also explain the
policy of most countries to require the foreign companies participating
in that country's capital market to reconcile their financial statement
to standards of the exchanges where the securities are listed. How-
ever, the incompatibility of the different national securities regimes
creates "regulatory disharmony"9 within the international market, and
hampers the achievement of optimum market efficiency. This paper
first addresses the recent developments in the U.S. regulatory regime
and its impact on the trend toward an international convergence. The
paper will next discuss the various alternative approaches to securities
market regulation and examine the merits of these approaches as a
means of protecting investors in different domestic financial markets.
II. RECENT DEVELOPMENT OF THE U.S. SECURITIES REGIME
AND CONVERGENCE
A. Background
Despite globalization trends and increased transborder financial
flows, creating strong financial markets continues to be an important
challenge for all economies. Differing approaches to creating strong
financial markets exist depending on the general type of financial
market a given country has adopted. According to a recent study,
there are two prevalent market systems: dispersed ownership and
concentrated ownership. 10 While a concentrated share ownership sys-
7. See Marc I. Steinberg & Lee E. Michaels, Disclosure In Global Securities Offerings: Analy-
sis of Jurisdictional Approaches, Commonality and Reciprocity, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 207, 265
(1999) (analyzing almost all significant financial markets around the world including United
States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Canada, Mexico, Japan, and Australia). The
article surveys the national securities legislation. Id. While the authors merely described, but
failed to compare these systems, nevertheless, having examined the national securities regula-
tions they conclude "although the regulatory systems addressed in this article are based prima-
rily on the goal of providing full and fair disclosure to investors, jurisdictions embrace their own
parameters that determine more precisely what constitutes adequate." Id.
8. James D. Cox, Regulatory Duopoly in U.S. Securities Markets, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1200
(1999).
9. Manning Gilbert Warren, III, Global Harmonization of Securities Laws: The Achievements
of the European Communities, 31 HARV. INT'L L. J. 185, 186 (1990) (defining a conceptual
framework within which to analyze recent developments in EU securities law. Then the article
provided an overview of the EU's legislation in the fields of company and securities law).
10. Rafael La Porta, et al., Corporate Ownership Around the World (Oct. 1998), at http://
post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/papers/ownership.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2002)
(presenting data on ownership structures of large corporations in twenty-seven wealthy econo-
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tem prevails across Europe and Asia, a dispersed system is limited to
the United States and Great Britain. Depending on the broad struc-
ture adopted, a country's approach will inherently differ with respect
to targeting investment clients, levels of transparency, and regulatory
regime development, etc.11
The regime that provides significant protections for minority share-
holders predominates in the dispersed ownership pattern. Such char-
acteristics as a strong stock market, strict disclosure regime and high
levels of transparency define the dispersed ownership pattern. The
concentrated ownership structure provides better monitoring of man-
agement and can be characterized by a weak stock market involving
controlling block holders, private benefit of control, lenient disclosure
regime, and low transparency.
All national disclosure regimes are aggregate systems of social and
legal rules, enforced through both public and private institutions.12
However, because of differences in ownership patterns, the national
disclosure regime that supports these patterns will differ as well. 13
According to empirical surveys, a strong capital market is more
likely to provide significant protections for minority shareholders.1 4 In
economic terms, ownership is a bundle of rights that primarily in-
cludes rights of control to maximize the value of the interest held.t 5 In
terms of share ownership, it means that dominant shareholders who
mies). The authors found that except in economies with good shareholder protection, relatively
few firms are widely-held, in contrast to the Berle and Means image of ownership of the modern
corporation. Rather, families or the State typically controls these firms.
11. John C. Coffee, Competition Among Securities Markets: A Path Dependent Perspective
(Working Paper No. 192, 2002). (Examining the competition among securities markets and pos-
ing the question: How much does law matter?). Coffee concludes that different exchanges will
move in different directions because of a basic path dependent fact: they have different clienteles
of listed companies. Id.
12. Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets,
48 UCLA L. REV. 781 (2001).
13. The article does not examine an issue whether dispersed ownership has effected a particu-
lar model of legal rules or whether the legal rules have effected the pattern of ownership. To
adequately examine the issues in this paper it does not matter whether aggregate system of rule
and institutions initiated the particular ownership pattern or whether the pattern per se initiated
such aggregate system.
14. Rafael La Porta, et al., Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation, (Oct. 1999) at http://
post.economics.harvard.edu/hier/1999papers/HIER1882.pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 2002); Stijn
Claessens, et al., The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations (Oct.
1999), at http://wwwl.fee.uva.nl/fm/PAPERS/Claessens/eastasian-JFE.pdf (last visited Nov. 5,
2002); Stijn Claessens, et al., Expropriation of Minority Shareholders: Evidence from East Asia
(Mar. 1999), at http://www.worldbank.orglresearch/interest/prr-stuff/working-papers/2088.pdf
(last visited Oct. 25, 2002).
15. Carl Sheeler, Two Halves Don't Equal a Whole: Theory & Practice of the Minority Interest
(Oct. 2002), at http://www.aappraisals.com/articles/minority.htm (last visited Nov. 3. 2002).
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exercise more control can extract private benefits from their position.
Since their benefits come from the value of a corporation, they in turn
can exercise minority shareholder expropriation. In companies where
dominant shareholders (blockholder) are a family group that, at the
same time, keeps management positions - like in Korean chaebol cor-
porate groups 16- minority shareholders' expropriation becomes more
likely through such means as self-dealing. Although it is difficult to
control insider trading and self- dealing, almost every country, more
or less successfully, makes efforts to restrict such activities. 17
In corporations where minority shareholders do not own an interest
that enables them to participate in corporate control, minority share-
holders consistently receive a lower value per pro rata share. Since
minority shareholders' interests are fractional, lack of control and
marketability are usually inherent in their interest.18 Consequently,
there is a higher capacity to expropriate wealth from minority share-
holders in countries with higher control premiums. 19 Recent research
has established that the ability to protect minority shareholders' inter-
ests has a direct correlation to the size, depth, and liquidity of that
country's securities market.20 Good protection of minority sharehold-
ers induces greater investment participation by outside investors. 21
The restraining of investor expropriation is an increasingly important
determinant in the ability of a country to attract increased investment
in its economy through a robust financial market. With the increase in
global investing, and the corresponding increase in competition be-
tween international financial markets, the different approaches to in-
16. See Curtis J. Milhaupt, Privatization and Corporate Governance in a United Korea, 26 J.
CORP. L. 199 (2001).
17. Roberta S. Karmel, Transnational Takeover Talk-Regulations Relation to Tender Offers
and Insider Trading in the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Australia, 66 U. CIN.
L. REv. 1133, 1149-52 (1998).
18. Tomas B. Eriksen, Court Rules on Majority/Minority Shareholder Issue (Oct. 2002), at
http://www.jordanscharder.com/articles/articleO133.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2002).
19. See Black, supra note 12.
20. Rafael La Porta, et al., Law and Finance (1998), at http://post.economics.harvard.edu/
faculty/shleifer/papersllawandfinance.pdf (last visited Oct. 2002) (examining legal rules covering
protection of corporate shareholders and creditors, the origin of these rules, and the quality of
their enforcement in forty-nine countries. The authors found that concentration of ownership of
shares in the largest public companies is negatively related to investor protections). See also infra
notes 50 & 51.
21. See Tatiana Nenova, The Value of Corporate Votes and Control Benefits: A Cross-Country
Analysis (Sept. 21, 2000), at http:/papers.ssrn.comsol3/delivery.cfm/000809550.pdf (last visited
Nov. 3, 2002). The analysis in this paper shows that control benefits are an important part of the
value of the firm, and vary widely across countries. Also, the paper shows that the legal frame-
work does exert a paramount impact on the amount of total firm value that controlling share-
holders are able to appropriate.
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vestor protections will continue to play a significant role in a nation's
ability to develop robust financial markets.
The U. S. financial market is a market with a dispersed share own-
ership pattern that has been characterized as a strong security market
with a high transparency and rigorous disclosure regime. Since a
strong securities market relates to the protection of minority share-
holders, easy access to company financial information and protection
from managers' self-dealing are crucial aspects of such implementa-
tion.22 Each country sets forth its own standards dependent on its reg-
ulatory demands and external environment. The U.S. disclosure
regime is one of the most rigorous regimes of the international securi-
ties markets. During the last few decades the U. S. securities market
has soared in comparison to European and Asian markets. Drawing
on the U.S. experience, it appears therefore, that rigorous disclosure
rules have a positive effect on investor confidence and healthy market
conditions.
B. U.S. Securities Requirements for Foreign Issuers
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is the U.S. regula-
tory authority responsible for regulating the U.S. securities market. It
primarily regulates publicly traded securities. Foundational to the U.S.
regulatory regime are the dual components of public disclosure and
securities registration. 23 The U.S. security regulations focus on the
principle of full disclosure.24 Delivering information about a com-
pany's financial health and future business prospects to an individual
investor with a controlling interest is a relatively simple matter. How-
ever, an important component of the U.S. system is to require this
type of information to be fully and publicly disclosed so that all inves-
tors can make informed decisions on future investment transactions.25
The second key point of the U. S. securities regulation is that the se-
curities must be registered with the SEC, unless the law provides for
an exemption.
The Securities Act of 1933 (the "Securities Act") is the core of the
U.S. security regime. Absent an exemption, every security offered for
sale, or that is sold, must be registered with the SEC. The Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act") extended securities regu-
22. See Black, supra note 12.
23. See Frode Jensen, III, The Attractions of the U.S. Securities Markets to Foreign Issuers and
the Alterndtive Methods of Accessing the U.S. Markets: From a Legal Perspective, 17 FORDHAM
Ircr'L L.J. S25, *$26,*$27 (1994).
24. Id. at S25, *S27, n.9.
25. Id. at *S27, n.9.
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lation to trading in previously issued securities, which are already dis-
tributed. The 34 Exchange Act requires publicly traded companies to
file annual and periodic reports with the SEC, including an audited
annual financial statement. It is also provides a private cause of action
for purchasers of those securities where the publicly filed information
contains material misstatement or omission.
The Security Act also applies to foreign issuers26 that publicly raise
capital or list their shares on the U.S. securities market, requiring
them to comply with the registration requirements of the Security Act.
There are the three principal types27 of primary offerings that foreign
issuers can use in the United States: public offerings, private place-
ments, and Rule 144A offerings. The financial registration require-
ments with which foreign issuers must comply when seeking to
publicly raise capital are similar to the registration requirements for
domestic companies. Foreign companies disclosure requirements are
set forth in form F-i, which is similar to the form S-1 used by domestic
companies. The primary differences in the two disclosure require-
ments concern the disclosure of non-financial information. These dif-
ferences will be scrutinized below.
Private placement offerings are exempt from registration require-
ments as long as they meet the requisite private placement require-
ments.28 These requirements include: public advertising of the
offering is prohibited, the offer is made to a limited number of offer-
ees, adequate access to relevant information is provided, and resale of
the securities is restricted (but not all together prohibited). The disad-
vantage of the private placement scheme is its low liquidity for
investors.
The low liquidity stems from the fact that private placement securi-
ties cannot be traded on the public markets. To reduce the negative
* impact of private placement rules on investor liquidity and increase
market efficiency of private placements, the SEC enacted rule 144A.
One of the primary goals of 144A was to increase foreign investment
in the U.S. economy through private placement offerings. It allows
unrestricted resale of private placement offerings to qualified institu-
tional buyers (QIB). 29
26. Since this paper examines the question whether companies should be required to reconcile
their financial statements to standards of an exchange where their securities are listed or be
allowed to prepare their financial statements according to the state or nation of the issuer's
domicile or another regulatory body, it deems just to consider the U.S. regulation regarding the
only foreign issuers.
27. American Depositary Receipts ("ADR") is not covered in this paper.
28. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 77d(2) (2002).
29. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A.
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C. Amended International Disclosure Standards30
The SEC, a member of the International Organization of Securities
Commissions (IOSCO),31 has participated in harmonization programs
sponsored by IOSCO. In 1998, the SEC adopted IOSCO's core set of
non-financial disclosure standards for foreign private issuers. The SEC
stated the decision to adopt the International Disclosure Standards
was based on its conclusion that the "standards were of high quality
and that their adoption would provide information comparable to the
amount and quality of information that U.S. investors receive to-
day."'32 As a result of this adoption, the SEC considerably changed the
non-financial disclosure requirements of Form 20-F and registration
30. New SEC Disclosure Standards:
1) Major Shareholders and Related Party Transactions.
Item 7 of revised Form 20-F requires that "beneficial owner" must disclose information in
regard to transactions only for holdings above five precent as opposed to ten percent under the
old rule. At the same time, if the issuers' home country requires them to disclose their beneficial
owners at an even lower percentage, the foreign issuers must disclose such ownership. See 17
C.F.R. § 239.31, at 53904 (2002). The percentage change puts the required disclosure for foreign
issuers on par with the requirements for domestic issuers. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.403(a) (2000).
Also, the form now requires additional information regarding related party transactions that
have occurred since the beginning of the three financial years preceding the date of the offering
document. See 17 C.F.R. § 239.31, at 53918 (2002).
2) Compensation of Directors and Officers.
The new Form-20F requires disclosure of information about the compensation and share
ownership of directors and senior management. Also, the new form requires more information
about company's employees than the previous one. See 17 C.F.R. § 239.31, at 53917 (2002).
3) Additional Information in Regard to the Trading Market.
The new form requires a description of the offering, the nature of the trading market for the
issuer's securities, the plan of share distribution, the disclosure of information regarding person
or entity offering to sell the shares, expenses, the lack of liquidity for the issuer's securities, and
others. See 17 C.F.R. § 239.31, at 53920 (2002).
4) The age of the Financial Statements.
The new form has more restrictive requirements regarding the permitted age of financial
statements. The form requires that issuer's audited financial statements be no older than fifteen
months at "the time of the offering or listing," in other words, the effective date of the
registration statement. This form can be distinguished from previous Rule 3-19 of Regulation S-
X that permitted the SEC to proclaim a registration statement effective with audited financial
statements as old as 18 months. Also, when an initial public offering takes place, the audited
financial statements must be no older than 12 months from the time when the offering document
was filed. This stricter rule for initial public offerings does not apply to foreign issuers offering
securities in the United States for the first time if they already are public in their home country.
See 17 C.F.R. § 239.31, at 53902 (2002).
31. Issues regarding the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) will
be viewed below.
32. International Accounting Standards Concept Release, Securities Act Release No. 7801, 65
Fed. Reg. 8896, 8899 at 8897 (Feb. 23, 2000) [hereinafter IAS Concept Release].
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statement requirements on Form F-1, F-2, F-3, and F-4.33 In some
cases, the new Form 20-F requires more disclosure than the old rule.34
D. Accounting Standards
Because of different accounting traditions around the world, ac-
counting principles vary widely. In the United States, accounting prin-
ciples have been developed to meet the needs of capital markets. The
market regulation approach adopted in the United States is depen-
dent upon supplying high quality financial information to capital mar-
ket participants in order to facilitate informed decisions by investors.35
The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) sets the ac-
counting standards to be used in preparing the financial statements for
firms that are registrants with the SEC.36 Thus, domestic firms that are
registrants with SEC must file financial reports using U.S. Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP).37 Foreign issuers wanting
full access to the U.S. financial market and filing with the SEC can use
the U.S. GAAP, their home country GAAP, or international stan-
dards-although if they use their home country GAAP or interna-
tional standards, foreign issuers must provide reconciliation to the
U.S. GAAP.38 Requirements are different depending upon the nature
of the foreign entity.39 According to Rule 2-02(b) of Regulation S-X,
an auditor in compliance with U.S. independence requirements must
audit all financial statements in accordance with U.S. GAAP.40 For-
eign private issuers have some exceptions from reconciliation
requirements. 41
While the SEC has revised its disclosure requirements to more
closely follow established global financial reporting standards, the ba-
sic principles underlying the U.S. regulatory regime of investor protec-
33. See International Disclosure Standards, Securities Act Release No. 7745, 64 Fed. Reg.
53,900 53,901 (Oct. 5, 1999).
34. For a summary of the changes to Form 20-F, see generally Sandra Folsom Kinsey, New
Rules for Foreign Private Issuers, 14 INSIGHTS 9 (2000); Mark S. Bergman, SEC Overhauls
Disclosure Rules for Foreign Issuers, 13 INSIGHTS 10 (1999).
35. See SEC, Report on Promoting Global Preeminence of American Securities Markets 7
(Oct. 1997) at http://www.sec.gov/news/studiesacctgsp.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2002).
36. Id.
37. 17 C.F.R. §§ 210-4.01(a)(2), 210.2-02(b) (2000).
38. Financial Accounting Standards Board, at http://www.fasb.org/IASC (last visited Oct. 15,
2002).
39. See 17 C.F.R. § 239.31 (2002).
40. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 210.2-01, 2-02(b) (2000).
41. Foreign private issuers are granted some exceptions from reconciliation requirements. For
a further discussion of this question see Roberta S. Karmel, Will Convergence of Financial Dis-
closure Standards Change SEC Regulation of Foreign Issuers?. 26 BROOK. L. INT'L L. 485 (2000).
2004]
524 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL
tion continue to be promoted "through [requiring] full and fair
disclosure." 42
E. Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Non-U.S. Companies
On July 30, 2002, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (the "Act") was signed
into law. The Act aims to enhance investor protection by increasing
the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosure. This Act is broad
in scope and generally makes no distinction between U.S. and foreign
private issuers listed in the United States. It applies to all U.S. and
non-U.S. issuers ("reporting companies") that have registered or filed
reports with the SEC under the Exchange Act or that have filed a
registration statement for a securities offering under the Securities
Act, even if the registration statement is not yet effective. The Act will
profoundly affect both U.S. and non-U.S. companies. Before this Act
was adopted, the SEC had provided foreign private issuers with a
number of accommodations. These accommodations consisted of us-
ing accounting principles of the home country with reconciliation to
U.S. GAAP; applying the international disclosure standards, like re-
porting aggregate executive compensation disclosure rather then indi-
vidual disclosure (if an issuer's home country permits it); and
exempting non-U.S. companies from the proxy rules. Also, it allowed
for interim reporting on the basis of an issuer's "home country and
stock exchange practice ... that are tailored to the needs of foreign
private issuers, ' 43 rather than mandated quarterly reports and acqui-
escence in New York Stock Exchange and National Association of Se-
curities Dealers corporate governance standards. 44
Since this Act was adopted, new responsibilities have been imposed
on reporting companies, their directors, their lawyers, and their audi-
tors. The Act's provisions affect the internal corporate governance
rules and activity of non-U.S. reporting companies, their relationships
with their outside auditors, and the information they must provide in
the U.S. market. Thus, the Act sets forth requirements for an audit
committee of independent directors for non-U.S. listed companies and
prohibitions on loans extended to or arranged by a company to its
officers and directors. Also, the Act requires foreign public accounting
firms that audit SEC-registered issuers, including foreign private issu-
ers, to register with the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
(the "Board") and be subject to its oversight. Many rules of this Act
42. See 17 C.F.R. § 239.31, at 8897 (2002).
43. See Petition for Rulemaking Relating to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Aug. 19, 2002),
at http://www.sec.govfrules/proposeds72102/tmmalanl.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2002).
44. Id.
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become effective only after their adoption by the SEC or the Board.
Certain requirements, such as prohibition on personal loans to execu-
tives and forfeiture of certain bonuses and profits, became effective
immediately.
Almost all provisions of the Act have become the subject of consid-
erable concern and extensive discussion outside and inside the United
States. 45 Most of them have extended to many aspects of the internal
rules of corporate governance of foreign companies and their audi-
tors. Moreover, many technical terms of the provisions are stated us-
ing U.S. legal concepts.46 The extraterritorial effects of this Act
burden foreign issuers with unjustified requirements and hinder the
process of reciprocity and harmonization of international capital mar-
kets. The intention of the U.S. Congress to enhance investor protec-
tion and to improve the efficacy of the system of regulation is
understandable. At the same time, as many opponents have pointed
out, "the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has largely ignored the differences in
practices and corporate governance regimes between the United
States and other countries. ' 47 The previous policy of the SEC demon-
strated its capability to provide foreign private issuers with a number
of accommodations that were not inconsistent with the protection of
U.S. investors. Now the SEC, with its latitude in using its rulemaking
and interpretive authority to deal with technical matters, must provide
a means to accommodate the home country requirements and regula-
tory approaches of the home jurisdiction of the foreign registrants to
avoid conflicts in order to reach a prompt, sensible, and mutually sat-
isfactory outcome. Failure to do so, will likely result in foreign compa-
nies' diminished willingness to look to U.S. markets as an avenue for
raising capital.
45. Id.; See also Sarbanes-Oxley Act Expands Corporate Governance and Accounting Re-
quirements for SEC-Registered Non-U.S. Companies (Oct. 31, 2000) at http://www.ffhsj.com/
cmemos/020802.sarb acctg__reqs.pdf (last visited Nov. 10, 2002); Peter J. Romeo & Sandra F.
Kinsey, The Impact of the U.S. Corporate and Accounting Reform Act on Non-U.S. Companies
(Sept. 9, 2002), at http://www.hhlaw.com/publications/pdf/020909_secMEMO (last visited Nov.
10, 2002).
46. See Petition for Rulemaking Relating to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Aug. 19, 2002),
at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s72102/tmmalanl.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2002).
47. Wayne Kirk, Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: Application to Foreign Private Issuers with Se-
curities Registered Under the 1934 Act (Aug. 8, 2002), at http://www.thelenreid.com/articles/arti-
cle/art_135.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2002).
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III. THE SECURITIES REGULATION DEBATE: A VARIETY OF
APPROACHES AND THEIR MERITS
The last few years have showed an increased debate by academics
and market participants about the proper mandatory disclosure re-
quirement to be applied to companies entering the foreign capital
market. Should these companies be required to reconcile their finan-
cial statements to standards of an exchange where their securities are
listed; be allowed to prepare their financial statements according to
their domestic rules; or should there be a single international standard
governed by an independent international regulatory body? Opinions
vary on this issue.
A. International Uniformity48
Dr. Uri Geiger, CEO of GalayOr Networks Inc.,49 in his writings on
the internationalization of the world securities markets, focuses on the
significant changes in the nature of these markets. Dr. Geiger pro-
poses that given the nature of these changes, the time has come for
the development of an alternative regime structure. Economic global-
ization has altered the way business is conducted. Barriers resulting
from the differences in the way the various regimes regulate their do-
mestic markets will not only obstruct economic progress in the indi-
vidual domestic markets, they will stunt global economic growth as a
whole. Dr. Geiger advocates for replacing the present domestic disclo-
sure regulatory regimes with "unified disclosure standards to be used
by domestic and foreign issuers in all developed markets." 50 Evaluat-
ing two existing models of harmonization, the European Union har-
monization plan and United States-Canadian Multijurisdictional
Disclosure System, Geiger concludes that although both of these mod-
els provide a "good case study for the applicability and effectiveness
of harmonized disclosure rules," 51 they suffer from several problems.
48. Besides approaches discussed in this paper, see, e.g. Alan R. Palmiter, Toward Disclosure
Choice in Securities Offerings, 1999 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 1; Richard M. Kosnik, Reconciliation
of Differing Disclosure Standards: Formal and Approaches by Regulators and Market
Participants, 1306 PLI/CoRP 157 (2002); Edmund W. Kitch, Proposals for Reform of Securities
Regulation: An Overview, 41 VA. J. INT'L L. 629 (2001).
49. Dr. Uri Geiger, Co-founder and CEO GalayOr Networks Inc. and an adjunct professor at
Tel Aviv Business School, where he lectures on entrepreneurial and venture capital, and the
author of two books: Startup Companies and Venture Capital (Tel Aviv University, 2001) and
From Concept to Wall Street (Fin. Times, 2002). He has his PhD in Law and Economics from
Columbia University.
50. Uri Geiger, Harmonization of Securities Disclosure Rules in the Global Market-A Propo-
sal, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1785, 1786 (1998).
51. Id. at 1790.
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His approach is to establish a Global Prospectus along with a
Global Coordinator as a substitute for the existing models of harmoni-
zation. According to Dr. Geiger, reciprocity as a form of harmoniza-
tion is less efficient than commonality for the harmonization of
securities disclosure rules in the global market. Because it is envi-
sioned that the common standards should be applied to domestic as
well as multinational offerings, Dr. Geiger proposes a two part Global
Prospectus approach: a Basic Form and a Global Form. Companies
that do not trade their securities in foreign markets should use the
Basic Form. The Global Form should be used for multinational offer-
ings. The disclosure philosophy of the Global Prospectus "would be
based on two special requirements:... detailed line item requirements
... [and] ... a general requirement to disclose any information that
may be necessary to make the information ... not misleading. '52 For
administrative purposes, Dr. Geiger proposes an international regula-
tory body - the Global Coordinator. It would supervise the "imple-
mentation, interpretation, and enforcement of the unified standards
by domestic regulators; ' 53 however, the Global Regulator would not
be a substitute for domestic regulators. Having examined a compara-
tive analysis of the disclosure requirements in the world's "Major
Markets, '54 Dr. Geiger finally concludes harmonization is not only
feasible but highly advantageous over the present approaches.
First, Dr. Geiger's proposal of adopting a combined universal global
prospectus and a universal basic form prospectus for use by purely
domestic companies seems unrealistic. Domestic cultural and political
concerns alone are enough to render the implementation of such a
proposal unworkable. Uniformity would result in outside forces hav-
ing a monopoly on regulation without any concern for an individual
nation-state's national peculiarities.5 5 Many of the differences in the
present market regulation regimes are a product of these economic,
historical, and cultural peculiarities. Thus, in Germany a supervisory
board has to have one half of the seats allocated to labor.56 The pres-
ence of labor affects many business decisions in terms of employee
protection and has an impact on regulatory rules also. The provisions
of the German takeover regulation differ significantly from Great
Britain's. The difficulty experienced by the European Union in its at-
52. Id. at 1807.
53. Id. at 1800.
54. Id. at 1807.
55. James D. Cox, Regulatory Duopoly in U.S. Securities Markets, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1200,
1237-38 (1999).
56. See Paul Halpern, Systemic Perspectives on Corporate Governance Systems (1999), at http:/
/www.mgmt.utoronto.ca/cmi/papers/paperl-l.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2002).
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tempts to harmonize regulation regimes is evidence of how daunting a
task it would be to implement a uniform global system. EU-countries
were not successful until a consensus of national concepts was ob-
tained among its members.57
Second, corporate and securities laws cannot be created as pure
new institutions without using or adapting institutions from countries
with well developed regulation systems. However, experience has
shown that piggybacking on other countries' institutions does not
work well. The experience of borrowing American corporate and se-
curities laws by other countries has not been successful.58 Law cannot
be simply translated into another language or resettled to another
country. Law as an institution, as well as its individual provisions,
must mesh with the local institutions. For example, Professor Amir
Licht examined an issue related to listing of Israeli companies on the
U. S. stock market and "the dual listing project" enacted by the Israeli
legislature, concluded that there is "doubt on the desirability of pig-
gybacking on foreign markets. Sometimes ... piggybacking can be a
ride to the bottom."59
Professor John Coffee argues in favor of functional convergence. 60
His approach rests on the path dependency, political ability, and eco-
nomic self-interest. 61 These three important constituents produce sig-
nificant national variations in the structure and design of economic,
legal, and social institutions, which are able to reform "local law in
order for functional convergence to occur."'62 According to Professor
Coffee, one of the varieties of convergence can be achieved as the
result of private action, such as a "bonding mechanism. '63 At present,
57. See John C. Coffee, The Future as History: the Prospects for Global Convergence in Corpo-
rate Governance and its Implications, 93 Nw. U. L. REv. 641 (1999). The author strongly agrees
with the thesis that "law matters" and "trust is efficient. Protecting the expectations of the mi-
nority may be the essential prerequisite to an effective securities market." Id.
58. See Black, supra note 12.
59. Amir N. Licht, David's Dilemma: A Case Study of Securities Regulation in a Small Open
Market (2001) at http://www.faculty.idc.ac.il/licht/papers.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2002). This ar-
ticle is an analysis of an Israeli regulatory program aimed at getting back home Israeli companies
listed only on U.S. stock markets, to facilitate dual listing of their stocks on the Tel Aviv Stock
Exchange. Id. Also, the article casts some doubt on the desirability of piggybacking on foreign
markets. Id. Sometimes, it turns out, piggybacking can be a ride to the bottom. Id.
60. See Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or Func-
tion, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 329 (2001) (examining the functional convergence by contract. This
technique provides "accountability to investors through private governance mechanisms imbed-
ded in the design of the security rather than through traditional public governance mechanisms
such as investor voting or capital market surveillance.") Id.
61. Coffee, supra note 57, at 656-661.
62. Id. at 673.
63. Id. at 674.
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foreign issuers enter into listing agreements with the U. S. exchanges
before listing their stock on the U.S. financial markets. 64 By entering
into the listing agreement, a foreign issuer agrees to be bound by
those provisions of the U.S. securities laws that are not mandated by
the foreign issuer's domestic regulatory regime's security or corporate
laws. Entering into the agreement is a necessary condition precedent
to having their securities traded on U.S. exchanges. 65 According to the
present state of affairs, Professor Coffee believes that it is through the
voluntary accession to security and corporate law by foreign issuers
that willingly enter into these listing agreements, that global conver-
gence of securities and stock exchange regulatory norms is more likely
to occur.66
While the listing agreement is an existing functional device, it is
questionable whether a governmental regulatory regime would accept
them as a means of navigating around a domestic law. The premise
that self-regulatory organizations (SROs), like the New York Stock
Exchange, the American Stock Exchange (AMEX), or NASDAQ, are
able to supersede or pre-empt another government regulatory over-
sight body, such as the SEC, seems unlikely. The SEC is empowered
to be the U.S. regulatory authority responsible for regulating the U.S.
securities market. The domestic securities regulatory regime is an in-
herent part of a national regulatory system which serves a national
consumer market and protects its participants. This function of the
national regulatory regime is determinative of its superiority for secur-
ities transactions in the territory. Stock exchanges, as self-regulatory
organizations, play a critical role as standard setters. At the same
time, because SEC regulations and laws supercede SROs' rules, SRO
rules must be compliant with the national law and regulations to have
any legal standing.67
The approaches examined above are not the only ones that have
been presented. There are a number of worthwhile approaches that
64. Id. at 687.
65. Higher disclosure, accounting, and market transparency standards and the enforcement
mechanisms are among them.
66. Coffee, supra note 57. For Professor Coffee's latest statement of his views, see John C.
Coffee, Competition Among Securities Markets: A Path Dependent Perspective (Working Paper
No. 192, 2002); John C. Coffee, Racing Towards The Top? The Impact of Cross-Listings and
Stock Market Competition on International Corporate Governance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1757
(2002).
67. John C. Coffee, Convergence and Its Critics: What Are The Preconditions to the Separa-
tions of Ownership and Control? (Working Paper No. 179, 2000) (examining the preconditions
to the widely dispersed ownership and "minority legal protection", Professor Coffee argues in
favour of the presence "of any federal regulatory authority" in a sense of superiority to avoid
"seducing courts and legislatures.").
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are subject to debate among academicians. Professor Stephen Choi
and Professor Andrew Guzman, whose proposal was one of the first
published, set forth a system in which issuers freely choose from
among regulatory disclosure regimes of an applicable national juris-
diction.68 Similar to the approach advocated by Professor Romano,
they give investors, not a regulator, the power to decide what, if any,
protections they need. Thus, Professor Choi advocates, "rather than
harmonization or internal reform measures, simply opening up a
country to competition (whether product, financial, or regulatory)
may have the greatest positive impact on investor welfare and the de-
velopment of financial markets. ' '69
Professor Paul Mahoney suggests that the securities exchanges
themselves, where the securities are listed, should regulate disclosure.
According to this approach exchanges should be the "primary writers
and enforcers" of regulatory regimes.70 He argues, "the benefits of
regulatory competition would be most effectively achieved by devolv-
ing more regulatory authority to the bodies that were the first regula-
tors-the securities exchanges themselves. '71
Professor Marc Steinberg, along with his disciple Lee Michaels, de-
veloped a proposal combining elements of mutual recognition and
harmonization. 72 According to this proposal, the International Organ-
ization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) should promulgate a com-
mon prospectus or offering document. 73 These documents should be
devised with different standards for companies from developed, semi-
developed, and emerging markets. 74 Issuers from countries that are
not in any of the IOSCO working groups would be required to meet
the standards established by the appropriate working group to make
68. Stephen J. Choi, Law, Finance, and Path Dependence: Developing Strong Securities Mar-
kets, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1657 (2002); Stephen J. Choi, Regulating Investors not Issuers: A Market-
Based, 88 CAL. L. REV. 279 (2000); Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Advising Clients on
Using the Internet to Make Offers of Securities on Offshore Offerings, 55 Bus. LAW. 177 (1999);
Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the International Reach
of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903 (1998); Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman,
National Law, International Money: Regulation in a Global Capital Market, 65 FOROHAM L.
REV. 1855 (1997); Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, The Dangerous Extraterritoriality of
American Securities Law, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 207 (1996).
69. Stephen J. Choi, Law, Finance, and Path Dependence: Developing Strong Securities Mar-
kets, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1657. 1727 (2002).
70. Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchange as Regulator, 83 VA. L. REV. 1453, 1455 (1997).
71. Id. at 1453.
72. Marc I. Steinberg & Lee E. Michaels, Disclosure in Global Securitiesofferings: Analysis of
Jurisdictional Approaches, Commonality and Reciprocity, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 207 (1999).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 263.
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its offering.75 Also, "[e]ach nation's antifraud provisions would apply
to enable regulators (and where authorized aggrieved investors) to
pursue relief where alleged disclosure deficiencies or other wrongs
exist." 76
Professor Alan Palmiter focuses on a system of disclosure choice.
He proposes, "the adoption of an enabling legal structure in which
issuers can choose the disclosure level appropriate to their securities
offerings" 77 under the 1933 Securities Act. For instance, "an issuer
able to attract investors with only Regulation D disclosure, but unable
to meet all the exemption conditions, could choose this optimal
disclosure.'"78
Professor Hal Scott argues that "in fully internationalized securities
markets, issuers in public primary markets should be able to issue se-
curities to investors worldwide using one set of optimal distribution
procedures and disclosure documents, and subject to one set of liabil-
ity standards and enforcement remedies. '79 He advocates in favor of
the creation of an off-shore free-zone, in which countries would per-
mit issuers to offer securities to the public (including residents of their
own countries) offshore, subject only to minimum disclosure
standards. 80
Professor Douglas Arner argues in favor of global shares.81 He ex-
plains, "under the global share structure, companies issue a single, in-
ter-changeable and freely tradable class of shares, which are in turn
listed on multiple exchanges pursuant to the individual requirements
of the individual exchanges. '82 These shares should be created pursu-
ant to the law of the jurisdiction of incorporation. Enforcement of se-
curities violations should be pursuant to the rules and structures of the
jurisdictions in which the listings would take place. 83
75. Id. at 265.
76. Id. at 262 - 264.
77. Alan R. Palmiter, Toward Disclosure Choice in Securities Offerings, 1999 COLUM. Bus. L.
REv. 1, 5 (1999).
78. Id. at 5.
79. Hal S. Scott, Internationalization of Primary Public Securities Markets, 63-SUM LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 71, 71 (2000).
80. Id.
81. Douglas W. Arner, Globalization of Financial Markets: An International Passport for Se-
curities Offerings?, 35 INT'L L. 1543 (2002).
82. Id. at 1587.
83. Id.
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B. Nationality Approach
Professor Merritt Fox, in contrast, proposes "the superiority of the
issuer nationality" approach. 84 The core of this approach rests on the
concept that each country has "socially optimal levels of disclosure. '85
Since a national86 disclosure regime aims to serve primarily the na-
tional capital market and protect all national investors purchasing in
that market, a country whose disclosure regime corresponds with opti-
mal level of disclosure has capital utilizing enterprises that produce
higher returns per costs of disclosure and increased productive activ-
ity.87 This approach benefits only the "domestic entrepreneurs and
labor," not foreign ones.88 Only the company's country of incorpora-
tion has a principal benefit.89 According to Professor Fox, U.S. re-
sidents are interested in disclosure of all U.S. issuers, even those
whose shares are offered or traded among foreigners. 90 At the same
time, because the U.S. economy does not benefit from foreign issuers
participating in the U.S. securities market, the U.S. has very little in-
terest in applying the U.S. disclosure regime to foreign issuers whose
shares are listed on the U.S. exchanges. 91 With respect to U.S. invest-
ment risk caused by holding a foreign issuer's shares, Professor Fox
suggests that that risk could be minimized through a diversification of
the investment portfolio. 92
According to Professor Fox, because of differences among countries
not only in corporate structure but also in external environments, each
country has different optimal levels of disclosure. 93 Since the U.S. has
a very strict disclosure regime, countries with lower disclosure re-
quirements will have a higher cost of compliance with the U.S. disclo-
sure regime. 94 Applying Professor Fox's issuer nationality approach,
countries that seek to raise capital in the U.S. market will be able to
84. Merritt B. Fox, Securities Disclosure in a Globalizing Market: Who Should Regulate
Whom, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2498 (1997).
85. The level at which the marginal social benefits just equal the marginal social cost. Merritt
B. Fox, The Securities Globalization Disclosure Debate, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 567, 572 (2000).
86. A nationality is determined as "an identifiable economic center of gravity in a single coun-
try where its original entrepreneurial talent and the largest portion of its management and work-
ers are concentrated." Merritt B. Fox, The Political Economy of Statutory Reach: U.S. Disclosure
Rules in a Globalizing Market for Securities, 97 MICH. L. REV. 696, 733 (1998).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 696, 822.
89. Id.
90. Fox, supra note 84.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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use their domestic disclosure regime and keep their cost of disclosure
the same. On the other hand, this approach does not reduce the vol-
ume of share transactions effected in the United States.
When comparing advantages of issuer nationality approach with the
international uniformity approach, Professor Fox concludes that in a
world which is becoming global, uniform disclosure standards will be
more useful and beneficial than other approaches. 95 At the same time,
it will be less effective at reducing investment barriers "than a nation-
ally based system using the issuer nationality approach ... [because] a
nationality based system using the issuer nationality approach would
be significantly more convenient administratively than an interna-
tional regime. 96
The national disclosure regime approach 97 differs from the interna-
tional uniformity approach because the first presumes to apply domes-
tic disclosure regimes to companies that seek to raise their capital in
foreign capital markets instead of following a single uniform standard.
It is an ideal situation for an issuer to reduce its cost of compliance
with a foreign disclosure regime, which could be higher than its bene-
fit. It also increases interaction with and accessibility to capital mar-
kets as well as its competition. On the other hand, a domestic
securities regulation regime with an optimal98 level of disclosure is a
part of the domestic social and legal rules, and private and public insti-
tutions. It would be very different for such institutions to fit into for-
eign external environments. In some countries, such institutions differ
conceptually. Because of these significant differences, these notions
are not even comparable. Thus, an accounting system is an important
part of disclosure requirements and good accounting rules should be
designed to provide helpful information. In some countries accounting
rules are designed as a control tool to facilitate tax collection 99 and
does not aid domestic investors in evaluating a company. Such differ-
ences might constitute a considerable part of a domestic regulation
system. After all, this complex system aims to protect domestic inves-
tors and ensure them sufficient level of honesty of a domestic issuer.
Consequently, an intention to protect domestic investors puts inves-
tors from foreign capital markets in an unjust position that increases
their risk. Viewing this risk as diversification 00 of investment is un-
95. Id.
96. Fox, supra note 85, at 567, 593.
97. Fox, supra note 84; Fox, supra note 85; Fox, supra note 86.
98. Id.
99. See Serguei A. Koudriachov, Comparative Analysis of Accounting Principles & Practices
in Russia and the U. S., 10-WTR CURRENTS: INT'L TRADE L.J. 20 (2001).
100. See Fox, supra note 97.
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convincing. Certainly, there is a way to inform investors of foreign
financial markets about such lax-regulated companies to protect them
and ultimately keep them from buying such stock. Under such circum-
stances, there is no reason for these companies to enter the foreign
market.
Another issue related to the nationality approach is how to adminis-
ter enforcement actions. Professor Fox argues that it is easier to ad-
minister a nationally based system than an international one.101
However, administrative costs should not be the primary considera-
tion. Businesses entering a market will want a degree of certainty as
to their liability exposure. In a global market place regulated at the
domestic level, certainty is lost. A company's disclosure policies could
be consistent with the requirements of one regime and violate an-
other. If a disclosure violates the regulatory regime of one country,
but the violation itself took place on the territory of another country,
which regulatory regime would enforce the violation? Challenging
Professor Fox's approach, Professor James Cox points out that en-
forcement issues "would raise a serious question of international law.
Prevailing international law recognizes the power of a nation to en-
force its standards against conduct that occurs exclusively in another
nation only when that conduct poses a threat to its national security or
substantially interferes with its governmental functions."'10 2 It is
doubtful a securities disclosure violation would qualify as to either of
these exceptions.
C. Competition by Jurisdiction
Professor Roberto Romano argues that the current approach to se-
curities regulation is mistaken. 10 3 She advocates fundamental reform
of the current securities regulation system and proposes an approach
under which a company would be free to select its "securities regula-
tor from among the fifty states .. ., the SEC, or other nation.' 10 4 A
point of departure of her approach is competitive federalism. Profes-
sor Romano believes that the federal mandatory disclosure regime
does not raise investors' welfare. 10 5 She maintains the advantages of
regulatory competition are the fastest means to correct this policy mis-
101. Fox, supra note 84; Fox, supra note 85; Fox, supra note 86.
102. Cox, supra note 55, at 1240.
103. Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation,
107 YALE L. J. 2359 (1998); Roberta Romano, The Need for Competition, in International Securi-
ties Regulation, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 387 (2001).
104. Id.
105. Roberta Romano. Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation,
107 YALE L. J. 2359, 2372- 80 (1998).
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take. 10 6 A single regulator cannot do it quickly. Competition in the
securities regulation would separate regulation from those imposed by
the SEC and, at the same time, expand the states' role in this develop-
ment. 10 7 Implementation of the market approach to securities regula-
tion, according Professor Romano, would require legislative
reform.108 Such reform would include congressional legislation to im-
pose a choice of law rule1 09 "Congressional action is the preferred
mechanism for implementing the securities domicile choice-of-law
rule, . . . because it is the most expeditious method for achieving that
end, as it does not require coordination by fifty state courts or
legislatures." 110
Professor Romano believes that a market-oriented approach is use-
ful for the international securities market as well."' She supports her
arguments by the fact that a uniform international regulatory scheme
is presently absent."12 Developing this idea, she proposes the interna-
tional securities regulation should be open to jurisdictional competi-
tion as well. 1 3 Thus, the market-oriented approach would make the
U.S. market more attractive to non-U.S. issuers."14 The ability for
non-U.S. issuers to enter the U.S. market without reconciling their
financial statements to a U.S. GAAP and without complying with the
SEC requirements would have a positive effect." 5 It would decrease
disclosure costs for non-U.S. firms and at the same time, U.S. inves-
tors would have the opportunity to buy foreign shares on U.S. ex-
changes."16 Under this approach foreign companies would be able to
apply "their securities domicile for U.S. trading purposes."" 17
The regulatory competition approach 18 at the state level within the
United States has been extensively debated. Its aim generally is to
give companies' more flexibility by lowering entry barriers to other
jurisdiction's markets and to benefit states. 1 9 The notion that compe-
106. Romano, supra note 103.
107. Romano, supra note 103, at 393.
108. Id.
109. See Edmund Kitch, Proposals for Reform of Securities Regulation: An Overview, 41 VA.
L. INT'L L. 629 (2001).
110. Romano, supra note 105, at 2411.
111. Romano, supra note 103.
112. Id.
113. Romano, supra note 103, at 543-544.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 388, 544.
116. Id.
117. Romano, supra note 105, at 2420.
118. Id.
119. Id.
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tition among the fifty states, the SEC, or other foreign nations pro-
duces a regulatory "race to the top" 120 is question begging. First,
Professor Romano analogizes such institutions as state regulatory re-
gime and national regulatory regimes as being equivalent. This com-
parison is flawed because such comparison violates the hierarchy of
regulatory jurisdiction. When examining "regulatory regime", the au-
thor takes jurisdiction as a basis for her classification. Jurisdiction re-
fers to "government's general power to exercise authority over all
persons and things within its territory. ' 121 It is well accepted that na-
tional authority is superior to state authority as well as national juris-
diction is superior to state jurisdiction. Therefore, it is necessary to
study the jurisdictions that fall within the same authorities. The na-
tional jurisdiction should be compared to other national jurisdictions,
so that the national regulatory regime can be compared to a regime of
the same authority. Hence, the German national security regulation
regime should be compared with the Japanese regulatory regime, not,
for example, the Wakayama 122 security regulation regime.
In the U.S. case, at first, it is necessary to clarify whether there is
state, federal, or concurrent federal and state regulation. A state's,
take for example Texas, regulation might be compared to and com-
pete with the hypothetic Wakayama security regulation regime and
the U.S. federal regime with the Japanese national one. The partly
state and partly federal regime should be correctly compared to the
Japanese national and a local one such as the Wakayama hypothetical.
Second, even if one focuses on the same level of authority, a regula-
tory regime is part of a complex set of social and legal rules, and pri-
vate and public institutions. In each country this set of rules fits into
national external environments. National culture, namely the values
that reflect a society's preferences and priorities, plays an important
role. Although the regulatory regime of each country aims to protect
investors and ensure sufficient honesty of an issuer, the group of pro-
tected investors might differ as well as the means by which this goal is
being implemented. Thus, if a regulatory regime intends to protect
minority shareholders, such regime creates efficient tools to reach this
goal. If a regulatory regime has been established to protect controlling
shareholders, appropriate tools will be employed. Consequently, in
120. Id.
121. Black's Law Dictionary 855 (7th ed. 1999).
122. Wakayama is one of the Japanese prefectures located in the southern part of the Kinki
Region on the Kii Peninsula. It is hypothetic assumption that Wakayama's security regulation
regime exists. There are some strong doubts whether it exists some day.
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spite of their superficial resemblance, national regulation regimes dif-
fer profoundly.
When discussing the possibility of applying the fifty state regulatory
regimes 23 to promote the "race to the top", the question becomes
whether these differences in regimes will produce conditions, which
will lead to a "race to the top" or "race to the bottom"? Based on the
premise that the regulatory regime is an aggregate of social and legal
rules, and private and public institutions, the regulatory regime of
each state must be viewed as a combination of such rules and institu-
tions. A considerable number of such rules and institutions are a part
of the single U.S. national system. Thus, the U.S. media is an impor-
tant source of information that, at the same time, is a part of the U.S.
financial market regulatory regime. Each state is deeply involved in
this system. A legislative system of each state has been influenced by
the U.S. constitution. Furthermore, the political, social, cultural, and
historical experiences of each state are an inherent part of the national
one. If one looks at each of fifty state's regulatory regime in terms of
path dependency, 24 one notices the same evaluation of the economic
system. Of course,
California differs from South Dakota, but these differences are not of
major consequence. Even more so, the close interaction between
states as the parts of the single nation creates a system that compen-
sates for such differences. If a hypothetic state would invest great ef-
fort to create a completely different regulatory or any other kind of
regime, it would be almost impossible to fulfill this goal because of the
external environments driving an important role in this process. All
foregoing aspects support an inference that differences between the
fifty state regulatory regimes diminish the difference between "bot-
tom" and "top". Therefore, there are no meaningful reasons to talk
about competition with respect to the different states since there is
really no competition. 125 If one state has a rigorous disclosure regime
and another state has lax one, and all other factors - path depen-
dency, external environments, group protected investors -are the
same, it will not impact the U.S. financial market as a whole whether a
123. John C. Coffee, Competition Among Securities Markets: A Path Dependent Perspective
(Working Paper No. 192, 2002). "[T]his article rejects the simple scenario under which in-
termarket competition produces an all-encompassing, regulatory "race to the top." Id.
124. Coffee, supra note 61. Coffee discusses a role of path dependence and states that national
variation in corporate governance reflects the impact of path dependency upon the evolution of
economic systems.
125. See Black, supra note 12.
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company applies one regime or another.126 Therefore, the impact on a
financial market would not be considerable 27 because marginal cost
would be insignificant. However, the effect would be different if a
company would chose between regulatory regimes of one of the U. S.
states and a Barbary Coast 128 state. Even if both of these regimes pro-
tect the same investors' group, the path dependency and external en-
vironments dissimilarity would make the distance between "bottom"
and "top" significant.
IV. THE Two TIER APPROACH
The above discussion serves to illustrate that the question of how
best to regulate securities markets in a global economy is receiving
wide attention and finding a solution is relevant to efficient develop-
ment of emerging market structures. However, all the proposals ad-
dressed in this paper share a common weakness. They focus on
harmonization of securities regulation regimes without addressing the
underlying reality of existing regimes - - the existing disclosure re-
gimes are an intricate part of an aggregate system of social and legal
rules, as enforced by private and public institutions. It is within the
context of the aggregate system that investors are protected and issu-
ers are incentivized toward honesty.'2 9 The national disclosure regime
is the part of the national system of institutions that not only imposes
regulative rules and supports them, but also enforces them.130 Most of
these provisions - authoritative principles and procedural rules -
consist of the legal standards imposed by a regulator. 131 The other
rules - listing standards, audit, accounting standards and others - are
set forth by other institutions.132
In each country, this set of rules fits into an overall national frame-
work where culture - more precisely, values that reflect a society's
preferences and priorities - plays an important role.133 A country can
126. For an overview of the state disclosure requirements, and more importantly in this con-
text, their exemptions, see Mark A. Sargent, State Disclosure Regulation and the Allocation of
Regulatory Responsibilities, 46 MD. L. REV. 1027 (1987).
127. The latest evidence suggests that American corporate law is relatively uniform, whether
despite of or whether because of interjurisdictional charter competition. See William J. Carney,
The Production of Corporate Law, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 715 (1998).
128. This name was borrowed from James D. Cox's article. See James D. Cox, Regulatory
Duopoly in U.S. Securities Markets, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1200, 1200 (1999).
129. Black, supra note 12.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. See e.g., Amir N. Licht, The Mother of all Path Dependencies: Toward a Cross-Cultural
Theory of Corporate Governance Systems, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 147 (2001) (introducing the
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have sufficient legal rules and at the same time a lax enforcement sys-
tem or a specific cultural attitude towards law or dispute resolution.134
Although such fundamental issues of securities regulation, like the
regulation of self-dealing, insider trading, and disclosure, have similar
text reproduction; at the same time, they have divergence in values in
different countries.
When one takes into account the reality of the role history, culture,
and social norms play in the development of securities regulatory re-
gimes, it becomes clear that any approach for solving the issues af-
fected by new global environments should include two levels. First,
domestic rules have to exist which will not be supplanted by the con-
vergence process. Second, as a final outcome of the convergence, a
suitable framework should be established conceptually. Such a con-
cept should include a set of basic premises which would serve owner-
ship market patterns (dispersed or concentrated) appropriately
according to their features. These basic guidelines could be either
adopted by countries as additional principles of their domestic systems
and would be applied along with domestic rules (the SEC has already
executed this method by adopting IDS); or, if countries have not yet
established their domestic regulatory regime, they would adopt these
principals and, simultaneously, be flexible to establish additional do-
mestic regulatory rules that take into account the features of their se-
curities markets.
A. First Tier - Domestic Regulatory Regime
Prima facie, it would appear abnormal to discuss whether a domes-
tic securities regulatory regime has to be superior. In terms of the pre-
vious debate regarding what approach would be more profitable for
the market, it is constructive to state that the domestic securities regu-
latory regime is an inherent part of a national regulatory system which
serves a national consumer market and protects its participants. 135
This function of the national regulatory regime is determinative of its
framework of cultural value dimensions (CVD) of cross-cultural psychology and demonstrating
its potential usefulness for analyzing problems); Amir N. Licht, International Diversity in Securi-
ties Regulation: Roadblocks on the Way to Convergence, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 227 (1998) (criti-
cally assessing conflicting trends of diversity and convergence in international securities
regulation and the degree to which they may be reconciled); Amir N. Licht, Genie in a Bottle?
Assessing Managerial Opportunism in International Securities Transactions, 2000 COLUM. Bus. L.
REv. 51 (2000); Amir N. Licht, Regulatory Arbitrage for Real: International Securities Regulation
in a World of Interacting Securities Markets, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 563 (1998).
134. See e.g., Stanley R. Boots, Note: The Personal Contracts Alternative-A Comparison of
Japanese and Russian Legal Cultures in the Russian Far East Timber Trade, 9 INT'L LEGAL
PERSP. 257 (1997).
135. Law enforcement is an inherent part of a national regulatory system.
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superiority for securities transactions in the territory. The particular
nature of securities among other commodities dictates the existence of
a mandatory disclosure regulatory regime. In order to support the the-
sis regarding superiority of the national regulatory regime, first, it is
germane to illustrate the distinctive nature of securities as commodi-
ties and then to demonstrate why the domestic regulatory regime is
more proper for domestic consumers' transactions than foreign ones.
Professor Joel Seligman put forth five principal arguments in favour
of a mandatory corporate disclosure system.136 He advocates that vol-
untary disclosure would ease concealment or misrepresentation of in-
formation material to investment decisions. 137 Underwriting costs,
insiders' salaries, and other benefits would be excessive. 138 Investors'
confidence in the market would decrease. 139 In the absence of a
mandatory corporate disclosure system, neither state laws or private
associations, nor civil or criminal actions will be able to ensure opti-
mal levels of corporate disclosure. 140
A mandatory disclosure system is of critical importance to a robust
securities market because of the nature of securities as a commodity.
Securities differ from other goods primarily because they do not have
an intrinsic value in themselves. Securities represent rights in some-
thing else and their value is derived from the future earnings potential
of that "something." This intangibility makes it difficult to measure
the value of securities at the time of its purchase. It is only through
access to adequate information that a purchaser is able to make an
informed decision as to a particular security's value and it is the issuer
of the security that has control over the information the purchaser
needs to make an informed decision.
A consumer buying ordinary goods, like a table, a car, or anything
else, almost always has self-help remedies, such as, inspecting goods
before purchasing them. Initially, a consumer has a chance to visibly
estimate a prospective purchase by seeing its color, shape, size,
weight, etc., or even touching it. When purchasing a car, a buyer can
take a test drive to check whether or not he feels comfortable driving
this car. Through this first inspection, a consumer cannot obtain full
information regarding an item. Because of the incomplete nature of
the initial stage, there is a second stage where a consumer utilizes his
purchase. The second stage serves as a safeguard for buyer satisfac-
136. See Seligman, supra note 5, at 9.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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tion. An unsatisfied buyer has a window of time, through warranty
provisions, where he can either replace his purchase or get his money
back.
Such features do not pertain to securities. A consumer/investor can
neither tangibly estimate securities - no self-help remedies are availa-
ble- nor inspect them while utilizing the product. The incomprehensi-
bility and complexity of a securities purchase differentiates securities
from the rest of commodities. However, this fact does not have to
deprive investors of their rights to be protected. The investors need
standardized and uniform information regarding the issuer's condi-
tions in order to be able to ascertain the value of that security, as well
as be able to compare it with other securities on the market. Just as
state and federal laws and other rules protect a regular consumer from
dishonest and fraudulent sales of ordinary goods on the consumer
market, the mandatory disclosure system has the same social function
and protects the consumers/investors from fraud and
misrepresentation.
The next question to be addressed is whether the national disclo-
sure regime of the territory where securities transactions occur must
be superior to other disclosure regimes. The domestic securities regu-
latory regime aims to protect the investors on the domestic securities
market from fraud and misrepresentation. It has to be superior and
cannot be superseded by another regulatory regime. The function of
the national regulatory regime necessitates its superior role in the ter-
ritory where securities transactions occur and demands that it not be
superseded or pre-empted by another regulatory regime. The follow-
ing features support this conclusion:
1. The intangible nature of securities makes it difficult to measure
value during the purchase process. Standardized and uniform informa-
tion regarding the issuer's conditions is the most effective means to
protect investors in the market. The mandatory disclosure system aims
to protect the consumers/investors from fraud and misrepresentation.
There are those who maintain that it is unnecessary for the SEC to
regulate the expectation interests of private investors and that the
market should be left to regulate itself. A company's desire to attract
private investors' capital and the need to compete with other compa-
nies for that capital will provide the necessary business incentive to
disclose information without government oversight. In this way, the
private investor, and not the government, is left with the responsibility
of determining how much disclosure is necessary to protect the inves-
tor's interest. If the investor believes the regulatory regime of some
2004]
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other jurisdiction provides sufficient protection, then the investor
should be free to make that choice without government interference.
The same can be said for any government regulatory oversight
body. For example, one U.S. regulatory agency deeply involved in
business practices is the Federal Trade Commission, 141 which is
charged with the responsibility of maintaining a competitive market-
place through the prohibition of unfair trade practices and anti-com-
petitive behavior.1 42 It is never suggested that a consumer or business
141. The Federal Trade Commission at http://www.ftc.gov/index.html (last visited Apr. 23,
2003).
142. In order to protect consumers from unfair method of competition and an unfair and
deceptive act or practice in commerce, the Commission sets forth a statute, such as the Textile
Fiber Products Identification Act. See 15 U.S.C.A. §70a, k. This Act deals with mandatory con-
tent disclosure in the labeling, invoicing, and advertising of textile fiber products. Moreover,
unless exempted, the Federal Trade Commission has authority to enforce provisions of this Act.
See 15 U.S.C.A. §70e. The Act contains a criminal penalty provision under which any person
who willfully breaks the provisions of this Act "shall be fined not more than $5,000 or be impris-
oned not more than one year, or both, in the discretion of the court." See 15 U.S.C.A. §70i. This
Act extends through the all territories of the United States, that is, it is also applicable to the
importation into the United States. See 15 U.S.C.A. §70e.
The Textile Fiber Products Identification Act aims to protect fear method of competition on
the marketplace. Competition is one of the most important and inherent constituents of the
economically developed consumer market. That means that the rules which regulate such
"small" issues like labeling, are to appear on the market where they are important to consumer
choice and such rules are able to be enforced. In an undeveloped market, there is a lack of the
economic and social appreciation of competition. It does not mean that developing economies
underestimate competition as a social institution. No. The developing markets often suffer for
many reasons from a shortage of an offer on the marketplace. That shortage, in turn, might occur
due to a deficiency of financial sources in the market. Under conditions of shortage of offers in
the market, the labeling problems hardly could exist. In other words, each market responds to
economic, social, cultural, and even historical environments in establishing its regulatory rules.
Because of this, the participants of each market act pursuant to the conditions existing on the
market where they act. A corollary is that textile fiber imported from any country into the
United States is a subject of labeling under the Textile Fiber Products Identification Act.
One can argue that the labeling is too small of an issue for the market, is inexpensive to
reconcile, and therefore does not merit discussion. The point concerning the labeling is not
whether or not this issue is significant, the point is that market participants have to comply with
the applicable market rules. If the labeling is more about fair competition, performance stan-
dards for electronic products which emit radiation provides protection for the public from un-
necessary exposure to potentially harmful radiation. In October 1968 the United States Congress
adopted the Radiation Control for Health and Safety Act, now incorporated in the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, See 21 U.S.C.A. § 321, to protect the public from unnecessary
exposure to potentially harmful radiation, including microwaves emitting electronic products.
This Act prescribes different and individual performance standards, to the extent appropriate
and feasible, for different electronic products so as to recognize their different operating charac-
teristics and uses. These standards are mandatory to comply with and they are the subject of
regulation by Part 1030- Performance Standards for Microwave and Radio Frequency Emitting
Products of the Code of Federal Regulations Food and Drugs (CFR). See 21 C.F.R. 1030.10. As
provided by this Part, there is a requirement for an "application of electromagnetic energy at
frequencies assigned by the Federal Communications Commission in the normal ISM [Industrial,
Scientific and Medical (ISM) Frequency Bands] heating bands ranging from 890 megahertz to
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6,000 megahertz." See 21 C.F.R. 1030.10. This provision also applies to imported electronic prod-
ucts into the United States because the frequencies differ from country to country. As provided
by the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, unless exempted, the district courts of the United
States are authorized to restrain violations of the Act's provisions. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 360pp. The
maximum civil penalty imposed on any person under this Act shall not exceed $300,000. See 21
U.S.C.A. § 3 6 0pp (b)(1). The remedies provided for in this Act "shall be in addition to and not
in substitution for any other remedies provided by law." See 21 U.S.C.A. § 360pp (f).
The Textile Fiber Products Identification Act (the Textile Act) and the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act (FFA) are an insignificant part of the national regulatory system that aims to
protect the consumers on the national market from dishonest and fraudulent sales. Through
mandatory disclosure of utile, accessible, and sufficient information regarding goods along with
the remedies provided for these Acts, the regulators assure an indispensable level of protection.
Federal levels of standards make the information standardized and uniform, and avoids obstacles
that could lead to customers' confusion. It is necessary to underscore that the above-mentioned
Acts are not rare for consumers' markets throughout the world. Most European countries have
similar regulation rules to protect their markets. Their similarity does not mean that such rules
could be superseded or pre-empted another. The objective reality that the similar text reproduc-
tion might have value divergence in different countries (For instance, ISM Frequency Bands),
does not advocate a discussion regarding applying foreign rules. The regulatory rules on the
particular consumer's market are supported by an aggregate system of social and legal rules, and
private and public institutions that together aim to protect the market and its participants from
deception. That is, the regulatory rules sufficiently correlate with the corresponding level of eco-
nomic development of each country.
Technical Electronic Product Radiation Safety Standards Committee (TEPRSSC) is an advi-
sory committee of Center for Devices and Radiological Health (CDRH). It was established in
accordance with the Radiation Control for Health and Safety Act of 1968. This committee ad-
vises the Food and Drug Administration regarding proposed performance standards for elec-
tronic products which emit radiation. Mandatory performance standards currently exist for
television receivers, cold-cathode gas discharge tubes, diagnostic x-ray systems and their major
components, radiographic equipment, fluoroscopic equipment, computed tomography equip-
ment, cabinet x-ray systems, microwave ovens, laser products, sunlamp products and ultraviolet
lamps intended for use in sunlamp products, high-intensity mercury vapor discharge lamps, and
ultrasonic therapy products. See Technological Electronic Product Radiation Safety Standards
Committee, at http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/teprsc.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2002).
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is one of the nation's consumer protection agen-
cies. Its mission is to promote and protect the public health by helping safe and effective prod-
ucts reach the market in a timely way, and monitoring products for continued safety after they
are in use. See http://www.fda.gov (last visited Feb. 15, 2002).
See FCC Office of Engineering & Technology, Questions and Answers about Biological Effects
and Potential Hazards of Radiofrequency Electromagnetic Fields, 56 OET BULLETIN (Aug.
1999), at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Engineering-Technology/Documentsbulletins/oet56/
oet56e4.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2003). In North America and most of Europe exposure stan-
dards have generally been based on exposure levels where effects considered harmful to humans
occur. Not all standard guidelines throughout the world have recommended the same limits for
exposure. For example, some published exposure limits in Russia and some eastern European
countries have been generally more restrictive than existing or proposed recommendations for
exposure developed in North America and other parts of Europe. In the United States, although
the Federal Government has never itself developed such exposure standards, the FCC has
adopted and used recognized safety standards for evaluating frequencies environmental expo-
sure since 1985. Federal health and safety agencies, such as the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the National Institute for Occupa-
tional Safety and Health (NIOSH) and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) have also been actively involved in monitoring and investigating issues related to fre-
quency exposure. U.S. federal, state, and local governmental agencies and other organizations
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should be free to choose what jurisdiction's competition regulatory
scheme provides sufficient protection because it is understood that it
is not an individual consumer or business that is being protected but
the integrity of business and the economy as a whole. The same is true
of the SEC regulation. It is for this reason that it is necessary that a
nation's securities regulatory scheme be superior.
2. The regulatory rules must sufficiently agree with the correspond-
ing level of economic development of each country. 143 Regulatory
rules of each country are designed to relate to business transactions
that occur in that country's market and they benefit the market when
they are able to serve it.
Only regulatory rules and consumers' transactions that originate
from the same consumer market are able to suit each other properly.
Accordingly, a national regulatory system will be best suited to ad-
vance national economic development better than any other.
3. Securities regulations and corporate law supplement each other.
The supplementary nature of their interrelation makes it impractica-
ble to supersede or pre-empt the domestic securities regulatory re-
gime by a foreign regulatory regime of another jurisdiction. The
interrelationship between U.S. securities regulations and U.S. corpo-
rate law evidences the inherently important role the national regula-
tory system plays in protecting investor interests and incentivizing
have generally relied on exposure standards developed by expert non-government organizations.
143. The most evident illustration of the previous thesis that the regulatory rules and market
generally correspond to each other is the Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Pre-
vention Act. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 6101-6108. The Act requires the Commission to promulgate regu-
lations (1) defining and prohibiting deceptive telemarketing acts or practices; (2) prohibiting
telemarketers from engaging in a pattern of unsolicited telephone calls that a reasonable con-
sumer would consider coercive or an invasion of privacy; (3) restricting the hours of the day and
night when unsolicited telephone calls may be made to consumers; and (4) requiring disclosure
of the nature of the call at the start of an unsolicited call made to sell goods or services. The law
expressly authorizes the Commission to include within the rules' coverage entities that "assist or
facilitate" deceptive telemarketing practices. The Commission's rules can be found at 16 C.F.R.
Part 310. "The term "telemarketing" means a plan, program, or campaign which is conducted to
induce purchases of goods or services by use of one or more telephones and which involves more
than one interstate telephone call." See 15 U.S.C. § 6106. 4. The originality of this Act lies in the
fact that an appearance of such regulatory rules tightly relates to the maturation of the consum-
ers' market. Telemarketing differs from other sales activities. Such differences assume that the
market has to have availability to reply to telemarketing transactions with well- developed com-
munication systems. Not every market is developed enough to absorb such business due to dif-
ferent economic capacities. In turn, regulatory rules also relate to business transactions that
occur on the market. Regulatory rules benefit the market where they are able to serve the being
transactions. It is outside the scope of the present discussion what are the primary the regulatory
rules or the consumers' transactions; the subject is only that the regulatory rules and the consum-
ers' transactions that are originated from the same consumer market are able to suit each other
properly. This proceeds on the premise that the national regulatory system corresponds to a level
of national economic development superior to any other system.
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issuer honesty. Corporations have a long history of being subject to
state regulations. Until the enactment of the Securities Act of 1933
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, corporate securities sales, as
part of corporate activities, had also been regulated by state corporate
law. From the time the 1933 and 1934 Acts were enacted, the role of
the state corporate law has considerably diminished. The 1933 and
1934 Acts replaced a hodge podge of state security regimes with a
centralized uniform set of rules and regulations governing fraud en-
forcement, proxy regulations and corporate obligations to investors. 144
There have been periodic debates regarding the need for greater uni-
formity in corporate law.145 The debate on this issue flashed again re-
cently after Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Through this
Act, State control over corporate activity was further degraded. Sec-
tion 402 of the Act amends section 13 of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 and prohibits personal loans to public company directors and
executive officers. 146 This provision conflicts with section 143 Dela-
ware General Corporation Law, which permits corporations to loan
money to employees and officers.1 47 However, state corporate law
continues to regulate other corporate activities, such as shareholder
suffrage and fiduciary duties. In this way, federal security laws and
state corporate law supplement each other.148
State corporate law standards are not uniform. This variance pro-
vides flexibility to incorporate a company dependent upon manage-
ment priorities. While such flexibility has some advantages, it also
increases potential manipulation in government regulation of a corpo-
ration that could be harmful to shareholders' interests. To avoid ma-
nipulation, uniform federal regulation pre-empts contradictory state
laws and regulations. This interrelationship between U.S. federal cor-
porate securities laws and U.S. state corporate governance laws is fur-
ther evidence of why a regime would allow a national securities
regime be superseded or pre-empted by a foreign regulatory regime.
In the U.S. system, not only would a federal disclosure regime be su-
144. In 1968, Congress enacted new amendments to the federal Securities Act known as the
Williams Act that addressed the tender offer.
145. See Joel Seligman, The Case for Federal Minimum Corporate Law Standards, 49 MD. L.
REV. 947 (1990).
146. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) [hereinafter,
Sarbanes-Oxley Act].
147. 8 Del. C. § 143.
148. The supplementary nature of their interrelation causes debate regarding whether a do-
mestic issuer has a choice to apply securities regulation of a different jurisdiction in order to get
an advantage of a regulatory competition. For example, a company located in France would
apply Japanese labor law merely because Japanese labor rules are more desirable for the com-
pany's profitability.
2004]
546 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 2:515
perseded, but so would fifty state corporate governance regimes. Such
a process would undermine the certainty that is important to business
planning, growth, and investor confidence.
4. The dispersed share ownership nature of the U.S. securities mar-
ket where investors are deeply involved in the market transactions
makes this market unique. The existence of such a high percentage of
the population participating in the market as investors makes it neces-
sary to have a centrally organized regulatory regime able to protect
investors and ensure them of the sufficient honesty of issuers.
The U.S. securities market's history has demonstrated a close corre-
lation between stock market volatility and national economic health.
A significant portion of the U.S. population is invested in the stock
market and much of the investment is in the form or retirement sav-
ings through pension plans. 149 These features explain why the U.S. se-
curities market is such a high matter of public interest. 150 This fact
makes the U.S. pension system different from others developed
countries.
In Germany151 and Italy, 152 for instance, retirement provisions are
based on three "pillars": state pension, occupational pension, and pri-
vate retirement. It corresponds to 69%, 20.26%, and 10.74% of the
149. Federal Reserve Bulletin, Jan. 2003.
150. Id. From 1992 the number of private investors participating in the U.S. stock market has
grown by 15.2%. According to Federal Reserve Bulletin, January 2003, data shows the following:
Families with Stock Share of family's
holding financial assets in stock
1992 2001 1992 2001
All families 36.7 51.9 33.7 56.0
As this chart shows, a significant percentage of Americans are invested in the stock market
and a significant portion of this investment is its retirement savings. The U.S. stock market plays
an important role in the private pension system. More than 40% of the United States population
relies on the stock market as one of the primary sources of income for retirement.
151. State pension provides an annuity income indexed to net wages. Occupational pensions
play a minor role. Private savings are a third source of retirement income. See Reinhold Schna-
bel, Annuities in Germany before and after the Pension Reform of 2000 (Working Paper 27/02) at
http://cerp.unito.it/pubblicazioni/archivio/WP-CeRP/WP_.27.pdf (last visited Apr. 30, 2003).
152. Angelo Paulli & Mara Tagiablue, Pension System and Gradual Retirement in Italy: To-
wards an Active Aging, at http://www.issa.int/pdf/helsinki2000/topic2/2tagliabue.PDF. The first
pillar is the basic state pension. State pensions are the most important source of income for most
Italian old people. The second pillar, occupational pension, involves only a very small part of
employees, 7.1%. The third pillar is voluntary private pension. In Italy it is considered a form of
saving alternative to other forms of financial investments, rather than a future supplementary
pension. "20.4% of Italian families have a life-insurance and only 5.8 % of families, composed by
old people, have an insurance policy." Id. (last visited Mar. 30, 2003).
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total retirement income. 153 State pensions 154 are the most important
source of income during retirement. Retirement provisions in the
United States are also based on these three "pillars". However, the
first, pillar is not as significant as in Germany or Italy. Most Ameri-
cans are dependent on personal savings to support them in their re-
tirement years. If one looks at data regarding mutual fund investment
per capita in the U.S. and in the several European countries, it is easy
to see how significant a role personal savings play in the U.S. financial
market in contrast to other counries. 155
MUTUAL FUND INVESTMENT PER CAPITAL
1 5 6
Country/Year 2000 2001
France 13.209 13.655
Germany 5.154 5.079
Italy 7.811 7.008
UK 6.981 6.887
US 27.570 28.138
As evidenced by the chart, compared to other industrialized econo-
mies, U.S. individuals participate in the stock market in significantly
higher numbers. Consequently, the U.S. regulatory regime - - an ag-
gregate system of social and legal rules, and private and public institu-
tions - - must place a high premium on protecting investors and
incentivizing issuer honesty.
B. Second Tier - International Regulatory Regime
In spite of the fact that the scope of each national securities regula-
tory regime is territorial, common goals such as an investors' protec-
tion make it possible that a process of regulatory regimes'
convergence can be developed. Globalization contributes to this pro-
cess in many respects as well. Actually, the differences between regu-
latory regimes do not arise from the wording of the investors'
protection principals. Rather, the differences come from the basic dis-
tinctions rooted in society's conceptual interpretation of these princi-
pals and from the historical development of societies. "Differences in
the [ . . ] organization of the ... societies can be consistently ac-
153. See Wolfgang Raab, Pension Fund Reform in Germany - Implications of the Riester Law
for the Second and Third Pillars, at http://www.bvi.de/downloads/INTR-5BUHBTra200602.pdf
(last visited Apr. 28, 2003).
154. In other sources it is called as the "public pension".
155. See Raab, supra note 153.
156. France 59,765,983; Germany 83,251,851; Italy 57,715,625; UK 59,778,002; US 280,562,489
at http:/iwww.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/ (last visited Apr. 30, 2003).
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counted for as reflecting diverse cultural beliefs.' 57 That is, cultural
differences 58 of societies determine the basic objectives of a corpora-
tion as a social institution. Thus, in continental Europe, the focus is
predominantly on the need to satisfy societal expectations, the inter-
ests of employees, and others. In other countries - particularly in the
common law countries - the predominant view is to emphasize the
primacy of property rights. Under this view, employees, suppliers, and
other creditors have contractual claims on the company, while share-
holders have "residual" rights. These basic differences underlie the
conception of securities and corporate regulatory regimes of each
society.
When discussing the differences of society's historical development
it is germane to note that as opposed to the United States securities
market, the European market has been predominantly a debt market
since the beginning of its history. Despite the fact that the oldest stock
exchange, Amsterdam Stock Exchange, and the world's most recog-
nizable international financial center, London, reside in Europe, dis-
persed securities ownership is not prevalent in Europe. Even in the
United Kingdom, "as late as 1980 less than three percent of the popu-
lation owned company shares. ' 159 Also, recently, securities regulation
in Europe had been "virtually non- existent outside the United King-
dom. ' 160 Since the time corporate law became well-developed
throughout Europe, its stock exchanges have been self-regulating,
with little or no direct oversight by national governments.161 Further,
European states have historically lacked full disclosure systems for the
distribution or trading of securities. European states have not prohib-
ited insider trading or other market manipulative practices as long as
157. Greif, A., Cultural Beliefs and the Organization Of Society: A Historical and Theoretic
Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies, J.OF POL. ECON. (1994) at http://
www.jstor.org (last visited Mar. 30, 2003).
158. Rene M. Stulz & Rohan Williamson, Culture, Openness, and Finance (Working Paper,
2001) at http://www.nber.org/papers/w8222 (stating that culture is "defined as a system of beliefs
that shape the actions of individuals within a society." (last visited Mar. 30, 2003).
159. Manning Gilbert Warren III, Global Harmonization of Securities Laws: The Achieve-
ments of the European Communities, 31 HARV. INT'L L.J. 185, 194 (1990). The author pointed
out several explanations including: "the major economic dislocations resulting from two world
wars and other armed conflicts; exchange and capital market controls imposed by European
governments; the predominance of bank lending over securities offerings in corporate finance;
the relatively small number of listed companies in continental Europe, each with only a minority
of shares available in the open market; relatively high transaction costs; insufficient or nonexis-
tent transparency and liquidity in European securities markets; the absence of regulation afford-
ing investor protection; lack of public confidence in and understanding of securities markets; and
popular aversion to the risks of securities investment." Id. at 194.
160. Warren, supra note 159, at 194 n.52.
161. Id.
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the United States. 162 In contrast, standardized and uniform federal se-
curities regulation was enacted in the United States in the 1930s. 163 As
Professor Coffee highlights, "the critical protections for the dispersed
shareholder are principally found in the federal securities laws, partic-
ularly those provisions regulating corporate control transactions. '164
That comprehensive regulatory regime is based on the premise of full
and fair disclosure of information regarding the issuer's conditions in
order to enable investors to compare these conditions with other
securities.1 65
Despite differences underlining national regulatory regimes, en-
deavors to create a uniform regulatory regime acceptable to all par-
ticipants of the global stock market have progressed. Regarding the
general principles of internationally agreed-upon standards in the ar-
eas of securities regulation, a regulatory regime is generally based on
three principles: disclosure standards (addressing non-financial state-
ment disclosure requirements but not accounting or auditing princi-
ples), accounting standards, and corporate governance. The
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) is
currently comprised of 110 ordinary and associate members that are
securities regulators plus a further 61 affiliate members that are stock
exchanges, international organizations, and other similar entities. 166
IOSCO aims to develop a process of harmonization of the interna-
tional financial market. The Objectives and Principles of Securities
Regulation, (IOSCO Principles) adopted in 1998 and updated in 2002,
are based on three purposes: protecting investors; ensuring that mar-
kets are fair, efficient and transparent; and the reduction of systemic
risk. 167 IOSCO adopted the International Disclosure Standards (IDS)
for cross-border offerings.1 68 These standards address non-financial
statement disclosure requirements and do not relate to accounting or
auditing principles. The basis of IDS is to assist cross-border offerings
by creating a single disclosure document to be used by foreign issu-
162. Warren, supra note 159, at 195.
163. See Warren, supra note 159.
164. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Cor-
porate Governance and its Implications, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 641, 704 (1999).
165. Id.
166. See International Organization of Securities Commissions [hereinafter IOSCO], at http://
www.iosco.org/iosco.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2002).
167. See IOSCO, Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation (2002), at http://www.
iosco.org/download/pdf/2002iosco-objectives-and-principles-of-securities-regulation.pdf (last
visited Nov. 9, 2002).
168. See IOSCO, International Disclosure Standards for Cross-Border Offerings and Initial
Listings by Foreign Issuers (1998), at http://www.iosco.org/download/pdf/1998-intnldisclosure_
standards.pdf (last visited Apr. 27, 2003).
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ers.169 In November 1999, the Technical Committee Working Group
on Multinational Disclosure and Accounting distributed a survey to
determine the extent to which each of the IOSCO members had im-
plemented the IDS. 170 Today about twenty countries around the world
have already adopted the IDS. Implementation of these standards by
different jurisdictions appears to fall into four groups: adopted for for-
eign and domestic issuers; optional for foreign and domestic issuers;
inapplicable to domestic, applicable to foreign issuers; inapplicable to
domestic issuers, optional for foreign ones.171 This illustration demon-
strates the considerable progress in the harmonization of the interna-
tional financial market regarding disclosure standards that address
non-financial statement disclosure requirements and do not relate to
accounting or auditing principles.
Accounting standards provide the essential means of disclosing in-
formation for valuation of companies to provide a comparison for in-
vestors' decisions. The absence of the same accounting language on
the global securities market hinders the reduction of investors' bur-
dens of protection. Because of different accounting traditions around
the world, accounting principles have developed differently. National
accounting systems have been a subject of exploration for many
years. 172 As recent research regarding development of accounting
standards around the word showed, the variances among accounting
principles are based on a number of conditions including historical
developments, differences between rules for individual and group ac-
counts, etc. 173 All together it produces a dissimilar result. As far back
as in the seventies, it was concluded that Anglo-American systems,
especially the American and the British ones, showed high values of
information; whereas the Continental European systems with France
at the bottom indicated relatively low degrees of information. 174 Sev-
eral studies in the nineties examined the relationship between disclo-
169. Id. at Part I.
170. See Technical Comm. of IOSCO, Report on Implementation of International Disclosure
Standards (2000), at http://www.iosco.org/download/pdf/2000-internal-disclosure.pdf (last visited
Nov. 3, 2002).
171. Samuel Wolff, Implementation of International Disclosure Standards, 22 U. PA. J. INT'L
ECON. L. 91, 95-104 (2001).
172. Anne d'Arcy, The Degree of Determination of National Accounting Systems: An Empiri-
cal Investigation (1998) at http://www.finance.uni-frankfurt.de/schmidtfWPs/wp/wp20.pdf (last
visited Apr. 30, 2003); Jere R. Francis, et al., Investor Protection Laws, Accounting and Auditing
Around the World (2001), at http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstractid=287652 (last visited
Apr. 30, 2003).
173. Id.
174. d'Arcy, supra note 172.
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sure practices and the capital market influence. 175 Based on the
requirements of certain stock exchanges, particular indexes of disclo-
sures were calculated.176 It was discovered that the size of the capital
market and the size of the participating enterprises were important
factors for explaining differences in disclosure practices. 177 Such sig-
nificant differences are very costly for issuers to reconcile, as well as a
significant impediment to the globalization of capital markets.
In an attempt to promote uniformity in international accounting
standards, in 1994 IOSCO completed a review of the accounting prin-
ciples issued by the International Accounting Standards Committee
(IASC).178 In May 2000, IOSCO announced its examination of the
accounting standards issued by the International Accounting Stan-
dards Committee and recommended that its members use
thirty IASC standards, as "supplemented by reconciliation, disclosure
and interpretation where necessary"' 79 to facilitate cross-border offer-
ings and listings by multinational enterprises. 80 The global business
community responded quickly. The European Commission (EC) man-
dated that by 2005 all companies with shares trading on stock markets
within the European Union (EU) must report to IAS. 18' For almost
7000 EU listed companies IAS will be the official accounting stan-
dard. 82 In addition, it is expected that companies with listed debt in
the EU will be required to report IAS results by 2007.183 This require-
ment may be extended to all companies operating in the EU, even
those not listed.184 According to research released by the world's six
175. See d'Arcy, Francis, supra note 172.
176. Id.
177. Terence Cooke, The Impact of Size, Stock Market Listing and Industry Type on Disclo-
sure in the Annual Reports of Japanese Listed Corporations, 22 Acr. & Bus. RES. 229-237
(1992); S. Archer, et al., The Measurement of Harmonisation and the Comparability of Financial
Statement Items: Within-Country and Between-Country Effects, 25 Accr. & Bus. RES. 98, 67-80
(1995); Marilyn Taylor Zarzeski, Spontaneous Harmonization Effects of Culture and Market
Forces on Accounting Disclosure Practices, 10 ACCOUNTING HORIZONS 1, 18-37 (1996).
178. Pursuant to Section 509(5) of the National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416 (1996).
179. See International Accounting Standards Committee Standards Press Release (May 17,
2000), at http://www.iosco.org/iosco.html (last visit November 11, 2002).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. See SEC, Speech by SEC Chairman: A Single Capital Market in Europe: Challenges for
Global Companies, Remarks by Chairman Harvey L. Pitt (Oct. 10, 2002), at http://www.sec.
gov.news/speech/spch589.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2002).
183. See International Accounting Standards Committee Standards Press Release, supra note
179.
184. See Peter Duran, et al., IAS: Some Pain, Much Gain for Insurers, at http://www.ey.com/
global/content.nsf/International/UInternationa-Accounting-Standards:-Some-Pain--
MuchGain for Insurers (last visited Nov. 2, 2002).
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largest accounting firms over ninety percent, of a total fifty-nine coun-
tries surveyed, intend to converge with IAS. 185
While a method through which European and other countries to
converge with IAS has been found, convergence with the United
States has not yet occurred. 18 6 Although the SEC has adopted the in-
ternational disclosure standards, it has not accepted the international
accounting standards. In 2000, the US Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC) issued a Concept Release to consider under what con-
ditions the SEC should accept financial statements of foreign private
issuers that are prepared to satisfy the international accounting stan-
dards.187 Several crucial points were noted in the Concept Release.
The SEC has concluded that it does not propose to accept a process-
oriented approach to IASC standards.188 Rather, the Commission in-
tended to continue a product-oriented approach, assessing each IASC
standard after its completion. 189 The SEC stressed that one of the fac-
tors that affects the differences between IASC and the Financial Ac-
counting Standards Board (FASB) standards is that IASC standards
are designed to serve international environments versus FASB stan-
dards that apply to a domestic one.190 Such differences are not neces-
sarily inappropriate, but they are difficult to compare. 191 Also, the
SEC maintained its approach not to accept a mutual recognition of
185. GAAP Convergence 2002, A Survey of National Efforts to Promote and Achieve Conver-
gence with International Financial Reporting Standards (2002) at http://www.ifad.net/content/ie/
ie f gaap frameset.htm (last visited Apr. 26, 2003).
186. Peter Jeffrey, International Harmonization of Accounting Standards, and the Question of
Off-Balance Sheet Treatment, 12 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 341 (2002) (examining issues related
to Off-Balance sheet transactions). The author concludes that accounting standards treat securi-
tizations in different ways. The same transaction can be on- or off-balance sheet depending on
the accounting regime employed. This inconsistency undermines the purpose of the standards
and injures the capital markets. So, without a harmonized accounting standard for securitiza-
tions, the securitization market will not develop as rapidly as it could, to the detriment of busi-
nesses, capital markets, investors, and regulators. See also d'Arcy, supra note 146. It was
discovered that in the USA the individual accounts are not published separately and a goal of
consolidation accounting with all other parts of GAAP is assumed. In contrast, in Germany the
individual accounts serve the objective of profit measurement and the regulation of profit distri-
bution, because the payments to the owners as well as to the tax authorities depend on the profit
figures whereas the sole function of group accounts is to inform about the economic position of
the group. It was concluded that for systems where separate objectives for individual and group
accounts exist, a different degree of determination according to the two types of accounts is
conceivable. Especially, if there is a strong link between tax and financial accounting a differenti-
ated result seems to be likely.
187 See 17 C.F.R. § 239.31 (2002).
187. See 17 C.F.R. § 239.31 (2002).
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 8908 n.53.
191. Id.
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other jurisdictions' oversight of financial statements prepared in ac-
cordance with IASC standards. 192 Having analyzed the IAS, the SEC
describes four possible approaches to recognition of the IASC stan-
dards for cross-border offerings and listings:1 93 (i) maintaining the cur-
rent reconciliation requirements in all respects; (ii) removing some of
the current reconciliation requirements for selected IASC standards,
and specifying one acceptable treatment; (iii) relying on the IASC
standards for recognition and measurement principles, but requiring
U.S. GAAP and SEC supplemental disclosure requirements for foot-
note disclosures and the level of detail for the line items in financial
statements; (iv) accepting financial statements prepared in accordance
with the IASC standards without any requirement to reconcile to the
U.S. GAAP.194
National accounting standards are an essential part of a national
financial system that serves financial transactions. Just establishing
one single set of high quality international accounting standards will
not alone make those standards compatible with national standards.
The IAS is not able to take into account particularities of national
financial systems that, in their turn, correspond to demands of na-
tional financial markets. This state of affairs determines the role of the
IAS as establishing basic principles of the international accounting
that combine common national principles and at the same time do not
conflict with them. If national standards differ significantly from the
international standards, it is unlikely that the national standards could
be superseded or pre-empted by the others without negatively im-
pacting the national financial system. The US securities market is his-
torically and materially different from securities markets around the
world. For instance, significant development of the U.S securities
market was triggered by adopting the securities acts of 1933 and 1934.
It in turn led to setting accounting standards that corresponded with
purposes of the securities act to protect investors. Due to that histori-
cal environment, the U.S. GAAP was better able to meet the require-
ments of securities transactions than accounting standards in other
countries. Even though business transactions become more compli-
cated every day and the U.S. GAAP also needs modification to ade-
quately address the current business environment, this fact does not
diminish the leading role of the U.S. GAAP for securities transac-
tions. While GAAP is very rule oriented, and therefore very detailed
in approach, it lacks the broad based principle orientation of IAS. IAS
192. Id.
193. Id. at 8904.
194. Id. IOSCO Responds to Enron-Related Issues, at http://www.iosco.org/iosco.html.
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principles, because of their breadth, provide good general direction
but lack the ability to respond to concrete concerns or problems. The
U.S. GAAP could be modified to adopt IAS principles without alter-
ing its existing rule based orientation. In this way, the two systems
could begin the process of accounting standards convergence.
Until this occurs, reconciling to the U.S. GAAP should be
mandatory for foreign issuers that are looking to enter the US stock
market. Otherwise, allowing their entry would jeopardize the protec-
tion that U.S. investors are afforded currently. 195 It is too early to dis-
cuss the possibility of a complete convergence of two different
systems. Taking into account that a significant number of countries
that will accept the IAS as a part of their regulatory regime by 2005, it
is appropriate for the USA to allow foreign issuers to apply the ISA
with respect to the parts that do not conflict with U.S. GAAP. 196
When considering the establishment of the general principles of in-
ternationally agreed standards in the areas of securities regulation, is-
sues related to the differences in corporate governance often are not
taken into account. At times the distinctions represent barriers to the
convergence of regulatory rules. Over the past few years, the improve-
ment of corporate governance performance has been one of the prin-
ciple means for strengthening the international securities market. The
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) 197 published the OECD Principles of Corporate Govern-
ance 198 to depict the "best practice" of corporate governance in order
to attract capital and protect investors. The OECD Principals are a
non-binding outline that embraces five areas of corporate governance
which are supposed to be the basis for fulfillment of a good corporate
governance framework. 199 In spite of the fact that these principles
195. See e.g,. Maureen Peyton King, The Sec's (Changing?) Stance on IAS, 27 BROOK. J. INT'L
L. 315, 315 (2001). The author analyses differences between the International Accounting Stan-
dards and the U.S. GAAP. She concludes that the IAS' "financial statement standards [...] are
unregulated and lack an enforcement mechanism [ .... the] U.S. standards [... I are promulgated
with great detail, interpretation and technical guidance, are audited using well developed audit
standards and enforced by a regulatory agency with actual authority." Id. See also Karel Van
Hulle, International Convergence of Accounting Standards, 12 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 357
(2002).
196. If these two systems are combined, it would reduce a higher cost to compliance with the
U.S. disclosure regime and enrich the US rules based GAAP with basic guidelines as well.
197. Today twenty-nine countries are members of the OECD. See http://www.oecd.org.
198. Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, OECD Principles of Cor-
porate Governance (1999), at http://www.oecd.org/pdf/M0008000/M00008299.pdf (last visited
April 13, 2003).
199. These five sections of the OECD Principles cover the rights of shareholders, the equita-
ble treatment of shareholders, the role of stakeholders, disclosure and transparency, and the
responsibilities of the board. One of the fundamental conclusions reached through this project
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concur with the conception of corporate governance for most coun-
tries, the basic objectives of a corporation as a social institution makes
these principles inherently different. Movement toward the similar
conception of fulfilling the common principles is a favorable process
for establishing internationally agreed-upon standards. For example,
the board of directors plays a very different role from country to
country. In the U.S. boards of directors usually do not have as strong a
position, rather they have relatively little powers in comparison to
shareholders. Executive directors, with a chief executive officer who is
also the chairman of the board, generally control the board of direc-
tors. The recently enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act provides that the
CEO and CFO must sign the annual accounts and other periodic fi-
nancial statements. By doing so, they certify that the financial state-
ments give a fair representation of the company's financial position,
based on sound internal controls.200 The aims of these requirements
are to make the responsibility of the CEO and CFO more explicit. In
Europe, responsibility for the company's financial statements usually
lies with all board members. These members often are required by law
to sign the accounts and other statements, with clear civil liabilities for
making misleading statements.201 The concept of making the CEO
and CFO responsible for the accuracy of financial statements is not
familiar to Europe.
From the above discussion it is clear the purpose of an international
regulatory regime is primarily to serve issuers that enter foreign mar-
kets. The framework of these regulatory rules should be based upon
the International Disclosure Regime, the International Accounting
Standards, and the Principles of Corporate Governance. These basic
guidelines could be adopted by countries as additional principles to
their domestic systems for foreign issuers and be applied along with
domestic rules. If countries have not yet established their domestic
regulatory regime, they could adopt these principles and, concur-
rently, be flexible to establish additional domestic regulatory rules,
while taking into account the distinct features of their securities
markets.
Since the number of foreign issuers is significantly less than the
number of domestic issuers on the domestic market, it is possible to
was the understanding that good corporate governance practices, which include high quality fi-
nancial and accounting disclosure, are essential to improving shareholder confidence in a
company.
200. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
201. Jaap Winter, Self Confident and Self Critical, at http://www.ebfonline.com/atforum/
atjforum/at-forum.asp?id=326&linked=317 (last visited October 30, 2002).
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adopt regulatory rules that differ from domestic regulatory rules im-
materially. In that way, where international regulatory rules differ
from domestic rules essentially, priority shall remain on domestic
rules. Mandatory reconciliation with the domestic regulatory regime
only in the area that differs from the international regulatory rule
would decrease issuers' cost to enter a foreign market.
C. Enforcement of the International Regulatory Regime and Scope
of its Application
An enforcement action of the international regulatory regime
should be achieved through the framework of an international regula-
tory oversight body. The IOSCO could function as a proper candidate.
Dr. Geiger's proposal of his Global Coordinator with some modifica-
tions could be the basis for fulfillment of a good international regula-
tory oversight body framework. 20 2 As Dr. Geiger highlights, such an
institution should be charged with three basic powers: decision-mak-
ing, monitoring, and dispute-resolution. 20 3 The important feature of
the international oversight body's function should be its close cooper-
ation with domestic regulators.20 4
As stated above, the international regulatory regime could be
adopted by countries as additional principles to their domestic systems
for foreign issuers and be applied along with domestic rules. If coun-
tries have already established their domestic regulatory regime that
applies to foreign issuers, the latter could apply either one without
diminishing the importance of the other. That is, the fact that a coun-
try adopted the international regulatory regime would not deprive for-
eign issuers of the opportunity to apply domestic rules. Thus, the
Security Act applies to foreign issuers that publicly raise capital or list
their shares on the U.S. securities market. Once the U.S. would adopt
the international regulatory regime for foreign issuers as additional
principles to their domestic systems, the foreign issuers have the op-
portunity to elect whether to apply the international regulatory re-
gime or the U.S. securities regulation. The distinction of such an
election would concern only matters of enforcement. The SEC, as
government regulatory oversight body, would bring enforcement ac-
tion against the foreign issuers that infringe the U.S. domestic security
regulatory regime. The international regulatory oversight body, possi-
202. Geiger, supra note 49, at 1800-1807.
203. Id. at 1801.
204. Specific role of the domestic authorities is caused by the purpose of the national regula-
tory regime as well as the particular nature of securities among other commodities.
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bly the IOSCO, would bring an enforcement action against the issuers
that violate the international regulatory regime.
V. CONCLUSION
Globalization has deeply impacted international capital markets
and made them more interactive and interdependent. Inter-market ac-
tivity needs appropriate regulatory rules that facilitate companies to
enter foreign markets. Countries involved in activities to create these
regulatory rules have to take into account particularities of the two
share ownership patterns - dispersed and concentrated -that exist
around the world. The dispersed ownership pattern is characterized by
significant protections for minority shareholders and promotes the de-
velopment of a more efficient market. The concentrated ownership
structure effects better monitoring of management and may permit
greater investment in human capital. To get both of these systems to
work together is a long and difficult process.
The U.S. financial market is a market with a dispersed share owner-
ship pattern that has been characterized as a strong security market
with high transparency and a rigorous disclosure regime for both U.S.
and non-U.S. issuers. The U.S. national disclosure regime is part of an
aggregate system of social and legal rules and private and public insti-
tutions that together aim to protect investors and ensure the sufficient
honesty of an issuer. At the same time this regime is part of the U.S.
national system of institutes that not only enacts and supports regula-
tive rules, but also enforces them. This whole system has been mostly
successful for the last several decades. A significant number of for-
eign companies are trading on the U.S. capital market and this num-
ber increases each year. To date, New York's stock market has a more
successful position than its European rivals, the London and Frankfurt
stock markets. The SEC provides foreign private issuers with a num-
ber of accommodations - especially Rule 144A - that are not incon-
sistent with the protection of U.S. investors. At the same time, the
foreign companies can also offer their securities publicly.
The convergence process is an objective reality of globalization. Ef-
forts to establish a global financial reporting pattern are timely. The
SEC along with the other members of IOSCO is involved in this pro-
cess. The acceptance of the International Disclosure Standards is a
considerable movement towards the harmonization of the mutual ef-
forts to fulfill the common goal. At the same time, despite the impor-
tance of the convergence and the rapid process of the economic
globalization, today it is premature and potentially detrimental to the
U.S. securities market to adopt the regulatory rules that do not fit into
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the U.S. securities market external environments. An approach for
solving the issues affected by new global environments should include
two levels. First, domestic rules have to exist which will not be sup-
planted by the convergence process. Second, as a final outcome of the
convergence, a suitable framework should be established concep-
tually. Such a concept should include a set of basic premises which
would serve both ownership market patterns appropriately according
to their features. These basic guidelines could be either adopted by
countries as additional principles of their domestic systems and would
be applied along with domestic rules - the SEC has already executed
this method by adopting IDS; or, if countries have not yet established
their domestic regulatory regime, they would adopt these principals
and, at the same time, be flexible to establish additional domestic reg-
ulatory rules while taking into account the features of their securities
markets.
After the bankruptcy of Enron and other high-profile business fail-
ures around the world, members of IOSCO (the most of which are the
concentrated share ownership market pattern countries and, accord-
ingly, have a lax-regulatory regimes) have regarded with favor the
identifying and examining of strategic issues of common interest to
securities regulators.20 5 This increased interest increases the possibility
that a uniform approach to developing strong markets through uni-
form financial standards will one day be a reality.
205. IOSCO Responds to Enron-Related Issues, at http://www.iosco.org/iosco.html.
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